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Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”) is a huge and
complex law with the laudable but ambitious goal of providing quality health care for all
Americans, regardless of income, health, or prior coverage. 1 It has been described as the
most sweeping overhaul of the United States healthcare system since Medicare and
Medicaid were enacted in 1965, affecting about one-sixth of the U.S. economy. However,
the ACA was controversial from its inception and four years after its passage it remains
unpopular with a majority of Americans. It survived a constitutional challenge in 2012
when the Supreme Court upheld an important part of the law known as the “individual
mandate” as a proper exercise of Congress’ taxing power, but this did little to quell the
opposition.
This thesis will trace the origins and political history of one of the most
controversial aspects of the ACA - the provision that provides free contraception,
sterilization and counseling services to all women of childbearing age, known as the
“contraception mandate.” By itself, as an idea, it seems unobjectionable, but its
implementation has required the forced entanglement and cooperation of those who
believe it is a sin and this has alienated many in the faith community. The mandate has
run into strong and widespread opposition from both mainstream religions and smaller,
less well-known religious groups, as well as those who sympathize with their plight,
creating its own separate national debate. The concerns are whether this mandate should
be viewed as promoting the state goals of women’s health and gender equity or as
undermining the constitutional rights of religious organizations to freely practice their
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA” throughout this paper), cited as Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). The ACA was effective on March 23, 2010.
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religion and govern their internal affairs according to their religious beliefs. The debate
will continue until an acceptable accommodation for religious practice can be found.
Although most services under the ACA are subject to cost-sharing, the ACA
requires a core group of “preventive services,” such as cancer screenings, to be provided
for free because of the policy decision to eliminate any barrier, no matter how small, to
accessing services that could prevent illness. The contraception mandate, which
ironically is not even contained in the ACA, was created by a Health and Human Services
regulation, which determined that contraceptive services for women should be part of
free preventive services.
Access to contraception is not a new idea, but neither are religious objections to
contraception. But while religious objections have remained clear and unchanged,
attitudes towards contraception and contraception coverage have evolved. Contraception
has followed a particular course from prohibited practice to privacy right to gender equity
goal to family health care issue, all in under 50 years. Particularly influential in this
evolution were science-based studies by the medical community and entities such as the
Institute of Medicine, which documented the health benefits of family planning, creating
the new recognition of contraception as a public health issue, not solely an individual’s
private choice, or merely a lifestyle issue. When the mandate became part of national
and state health care policy, activists urged legislation to provide access to contraception
to as many women as possible, which went beyond government-assisted programs for the
poor and unemployed.
Legislation then began to focus on the regulation of private employer-sponsored
benefit plans, which is how most employed Americans access and pay for their health
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care. To the extent that religious organizations were also private employers who
sponsored benefit plans, they were also swept up in this new government regulation.
The right to use birth control by married couples was first recognized by the
Supreme Court as a constitutionally protected privacy right in the United States in 1965,
and this right was extended to unmarried couples in the early 1970s.2 In 1973, abortion
was also recognized as a constitutionally protected privacy right in the landmark Supreme
Court case of Roe v. Wade.3 Given that these constitutional protections have been in
place for such a long time, that the use of contraception is widespread, and that the
contraceptive mandate itself is not a new idea, what exactly has sparked this outrage?
The story of the mandate as an idea about “fairness” that developed over time in
our culture and society, as outlined in this thesis, will provide an insight into the current
impasse of the parties. It will describe how the administration in its single-minded
reformist focus on gender equity missed an opportunity to build a consensus with the
faith community, and how further negotiations were caught up in a lengthy, adversarial
administrative rule making process that was unsuccessful. The strong reactions of the
faith community may have surprised a secular world that bases its beliefs in science and
reason alone, and shows how little the two sides understood each other. This thesis will

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Connecticut law prohibiting use of contraceptives for
married couples held to violate the constitutional right to privacy found in the Bill of Rights) and Eisenstadt
v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
couples held to violate Equal Protection Clause and right to privacy). It is therefore unconstitutional for the
government to prohibit Americans from using birth control. It is ironic that these original cases struck
down laws that prohibited the use and distribution of contraceptives and today the HHS Regulations are
challenged for mandating access to contraceptives.
3

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion is part of the right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. A woman has a right to an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy.)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birth_control_movement_in_the_United_States
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try to clarify the real points of disagreement between church and state beyond the rhetoric
on both sides, which will hopefully point to a solution.
The mandate was first announced on August 1, 2011, over a full year after the
ACA went into effect. It was greeted by a firestorm of protest by diverse religious
groups denouncing it as an assault on religious freedom. Many of these same religious
groups, and particularly the Catholic Church, had supported the same type of universal
health care goals which the administration was promoting and would appear to be natural
allies. The Catholic Church in particular is committed to vigorously combating poverty,
and maintained not only an extensive community outreach network for social services,
but also an extensive healthcare network of hospitals and nursing homes in the United
States. What prevented a coalition for improving healthcare and services?
The short answer is that the contraceptive mandate provided only limited
exemptions for churches and their integrated auxiliaries and excluded all other religious
institutions. The excluded institutions protested that they should be exempted like
churches, because they were exercising their religion through the good works they
engaged in. The government refused to broaden the exemption, but, instead, later on,
offered an accommodation to these religious non-profits, which purportedly would shift
costs and responsibility onto third parties. However, since the accommodation still
required employer plans to cover contraceptives, it was universally rejected as failing to
shift moral complicity. Religious non-profits did not want to be involved in providing
contraceptives to their employees in any way. Litigation ensued.
In its zeal to provide contraception coverage to as many women as possible, the
administration seemed to not understand or appreciate the real burdens it placed on the
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faith community and the consequences that would ensue. The faith community,
particularly the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, upped the ante with strong rhetoric,
which was not helpful to its cause. Unlike abortion, contraception may have seemed to
like a settled issue among voters to the administration. After all, before the ACA was
passed, half the states had already enacted their own laws requiring contraception
coverage and such coverage had also found its way into federal law. State governments
had been coexisting fairly peacefully with the faith community for years.
The administration did not, or could not, build consensus before it went ahead and
announced the mandate. In so doing, the mandate began its escalation into a big national
issue. The lack of consensus before the mandate was announced offended potential allies
and at the same time handed the opponents of the ACA itself a potent weapon to
galvanize opposition. The image of religious objectors coerced against their true
conscience to become part of the distribution network for contraceptives was very
compelling.
The mandate broadly required all contraceptive services approved by the FDA to
be provided by employer plans, which included not only contraceptives but also those
drugs and devices that, in the view of some religious communities, functioned as
abortifacients. Abortion remains a polarizing issue more than 40 years after it was held
to be a constitutionally protected right, with many Americans still strongly opposing it on
religious and moral grounds. Contraception, on the other hand, enjoys widespread
acceptance, but to the extent that certain contraceptive methods are considered
abortifacients, the contraception mandate became an abortion mandate, with great
potential to escalate the controversy beyond its original boundaries.
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The mandate became a powerful symbol and a lightning rod for many viewpoints.
In the eyes of some, the mandate was part of an attempt to keep the public sphere
“neutral,” to confine religion to something private and unseen, and to limit the influence
of religiously-informed opinions on public topics. According to this viewpoint, religious
institutions should be allowed a public voice to challenge the power of an overreaching
state. 4 Some saw the controversy to be as much about the impermissible reach of
government as about religious liberty. The government’s view is that the mandate is a
fundamental right that should not be extinguished by religious objections.
Framing the controversy as enlightened reformers versus conservatives who want
us to return to the “dark ages” is not helpful, because that view, taken by many advocates,
trivializes sincerely held religious beliefs and obscures the real constitutional issue. I see
the controversy as two sides with strong and worthy beliefs, grounded in our traditions of
liberty and equality, both of which benefit and inform American public policy. A
decision of which is more “important” should be avoided. The challenge is that an
accommodation acceptable to both sides must be found.
The administrations of Democratic Presidents Clinton and Obama, given their
legislative programs to distribute contraceptives as widely as possible, appear to have
sided with the view of contraception advocates that public health and gender equity are
the paramount issues. They certainly are politically popular ones, yielding more tangible
benefits than generalized and ethereal notions of individual liberty.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4

See dissent in Catholic Charities v. Superior Court, 10 Cal Rptr.3d 283, 321. “Religious institutions
enhance individual autonomy ‘by challenging the sovereign power of the liberal state’ and by articulating
alternative visions - ‘counter cultural’ visions that challenge and push the larger community in…directions
unimagined by prevailing beliefs.’”
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This thesis will also tell the legal story of the mandate from its first introduction
in federal law, to its acceptance and definition by the states, to its present form in the
HHS regulation under the ACA. A number of significant state, federal and Supreme
Court cases influenced its development with their constitutional rulings. The current
legal points of the debate have focused on what type of exemption is appropriate, what
employers are truly “religious,” and whether “opt outs” or any type of accommodation
are realistic alternatives.
The legal and cultural stories of the mandate have culminated before the Supreme
Court of the United States in the consolidated cases of Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores
and Sebelius v. Conestoga Wood Specialties (“Hobby Lobby Stores”). and the issues the
Supreme Court must decide. Hobby Lobby Stores, argued before the Court on March 25,
2014, was the focus of national attention, raising a case of first impression, of whether a
for-profit religious employer is a person capable of exercising religion under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).5 The case will have far reaching
consequences and is the latest development in an ongoing process to define the meaning
of religious freedom in our pluralistic society.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA” throughout this paper) is cited as 42 U.S.C. sec.
2000bb et seq. RFRA was effective on Nov. 16, 1993. Each case also raised a constitutional claim under
the First Amendment.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., et al., v. Sebelius Sec of H&HS Case No. 13-354 consolidated with Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp., et al., v. Sebelius, Sec. of H&HS Case No. 13-356.
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Chapter 1
The Rise of the Mandate in Federal Law
The ACA’s current mandate that employers provide prescription contraception
coverage reflects a public policy goal that has its origin in the early 1990s when President
Clinton first proposed universal health care coverage.6 This is when mandates for health
coverage began to be introduced. The Health Security Act, as it was officially called,
was a controversial bill introduced in October 1993, which had the ambitious aim to
provide universal health care coverage for all Americans. 7 Its mandate was to require
that every insurance plan offer a “comprehensive benefits package” based on the
generous employer-sponsored plans offered by the nation’s largest employers at that time.
The mandate also required coverage for “family planning services,” which was limited
only to voluntary family planning services and contraceptive “devices.” It did not cover
contraceptive drugs, although it covered prescription drugs generally. This omission was
noted by advocacy groups, in particular The Guttmacher Institute, which presented
findings to the Senate in March 1994 from its survey which concluded that private health
insurers failed to cover contraceptive prescription drugs in the same way other
prescription drugs were covered. The Guttmacher Institute’s efforts raised consciousness
of this gender inequity and creating a model for future legislation.8 Critics raised claims
of bias in the health insurance industry because it preferred expensive treatment over
prevention and ignored or trivialized women’s health needs.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6

Dailard, C., Contraceptive Coverage: A 10-year Retrospective (June 2004). The Guttmacher Report on
Public Policy. Garrett, L. Religious Firms Support Obamacare Challenge (2/7/14), retrieved on 2/9/14
from Publishers Weekly: http://www.publishersweekly.com
7

Clinton Health Care Plan of 1993, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clinton_health_care_plan_of_1993
accessed on 2/10/14. Opponents called it “HillaryCare” because the First Lady chaired the Task Force on
National Health Care Reform.
8
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Dailard, Ibid.
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The Health Security Act was strongly opposed and failed by September of 1994,
yet it led the way to incremental, single-service mandates at the federal level.9 Although
the Health Security Act was widely considered a debacle, it was the beginning of federal
health insurance reform, which then proceeded incrementally.
The next federal legislation proposed to address health care was the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. “HIPPA” helped workers who
lose or change their jobs (and consequently lose their health insurance) to continue their
insurance with their next employer by preventing the new plan from denying coverage to
workers based on pre-existing conditions. 10 In so doing, it increased the federal
government’s regulatory control of health insurance, which traditionally had been left to
the states. It regulated all employment-based health plans, both insured and self-insured.
The states do not have the power to regulate employment-based plans which are selfinsured under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).11 This
represents a significant group of people, because these plans cover about half of all
Americans with coverage through their employers.12 HIPPA created a precedent for
federal mandates to include specific types of benefits in health plans.
This precedent was followed by the Equity in Prescription Insurance and
Coverage Act of 1997 (“EPICC”), a bill that sought to require private insurers that cover
prescription drugs and outpatient services to cover contraceptive drugs and services as
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9

Dailard, Ibid.

10

Dailard, Ibid., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. HIPPA Fact Sheet Dec.
2004 Dept of Labor http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsjobloss.html; FAQ’s About Portability of Health
Coverage and HIPAA http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_consumer_hipaa.html
11

ERISA and the way it affects state insurance laws will be discussed in a succeeding section.

12

Dailard, Ibid.
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well. It would have extended the mandate to include any contraceptive that is FDA
approved.13 It was offered as an amendment to ERISA, as only the federal government
has the power to regulate employee benefit plans of private employers under this law.
There was no exemption from EPICC for religious employers. Proponents pointed out
that contraceptives help reduce the need for abortion as well as addressing gender
inequities.
The bipartisan bill, which never became law, although it was introduced again and
again for years in Congress, would have reached all employer-sponsored plans, both
those which were insured and those which were self-insured by the employer. It would
have extended the mandate to the individual health policy market as well because it also
amended the Public Health Service Act.14 At that time, Congress was hesitant to enact a
federal contraceptive coverage mandate for private plans.15 However, it was willing to do
so for its own employees in government sponsored plans.
In 1998, Congress mandated prescription contraceptive coverage in all insurance
plans covering prescription drugs, which participate in the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program (FEHBP).16 At that time, the FEHBP covered 1.2 million women and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13

Zolman, R. (2002). Insurance Coverage of Prescription Contraceptives, p.18 LEDA (Legal Electronic
Document Archive) at Havard Law School;
http://dash.havard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/8889475/Zolman.html.
14

Zolman, Ibid p. 18. The EPICC was introduced for years on and after 1997 without success. As
recently as 2007 it was reintroduced by Rep. Nita Lowey as H.R. 2412 but died in committee in 2008
EPICC Act of 2007 https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr2412#summary
15

Zolman, Ibid p. 19

16

The mandate was an amendment to the FY 1999 Treasury/Postal Appropriations Bill (HR 4104). It was
a resolution between amendments in the House introduced by Rep. Lowey and in the Senate by Sen. Snowe
and Sen. Reid. The amendment became law as the Lowey Amendment. It was signed into law by President
Clinton in September 1999 as a part of the FY 1999 Omnibus Supplemental Appropriations Act, H.R. 4328,
PL 105-277.
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was the largest employer sponsored health plan in the world.17 This action by Congress
was encouraging news for contraception coverage activists, particularly as the new law
was intended to serve as a role model for state legislatures and insurers.18 The mandate
includes a “conscience clause” exemption for plan sponsors on religious, but not moral,
grounds.19 In addition, individual doctors, but not nurses or other health care providers,
could object to prescribing contraceptives and abortifacients on both religious and moral
grounds20. At the same time, the ban on funding abortions through the FEHB program
became law.
In December 2000, a federal agency, the U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), made the very significant determination that the failure of employers to
include contraceptives in prescription drug coverage constituted sex discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).21 Title VII is a federal
antidiscrimination law prohibiting sex discrimination in the workplace.22 It is directed to
an employer’s treatment of its employees and the benefits of employment. The EEOC is
charged with enforcing Title VII, so its rulings are persuasive. The ruling was consistent
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17

Dailard, Ibid. FEHB is still the largest such plan in the world today, covering almost 9 million people.
FEHB Facts, http://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/publications-forms/pamphlets/ri75-13.pdf
18

Zolman, Ibid p. 17

19

Five religious plans are exempt by name: Providence Health Plan, Personal Care's HMO, Care Choices,
OSF Health Plans, Yellowstone Community Health Plan, as well as any "existing or future plan, if the plan
objects to such coverage on the basis of religious beliefs." Contraceptive Coverage Mandate in FY 2000
Treasury Postal Appropriations Nat’l conference of Catholic Bishops,
http://lobby.la.psu.edu/013_Contraceptive_Coverage/organizational_statements/NCCB_USCC/NCCBUSCC_Contraceptive_Coverage_Mandate.htm
20

Legislative Report: 1998 FY 1999 Treasury/Postal Appropriations Bill, Retrieved from National
Committee for a Human Life Amendment: http://www.nchla.org/legissectiondisplay.
21

EEOC Decision of Coverage on Contraception, EEOC (Dec. 14, 2000)
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html
22
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with the federal government’s public health goals for the nation in 2000, included in the
Department of Health and Human Services publication “Healthy People 2010,” one of
which was to increase private sector insurance coverage of contraceptives. The EEOC
ruling and federal public policy contributed momentum as the debate shifted to the
federal courts.
Activists turned to the federal courts and were successful in suing an individual
employer using Title VII to obtain a judicial mandate for contraception coverage in the
landmark case of Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co. (2001). 23 In Erickson, a federal district
court in Seattle in a case of first impression found that Title VII prohibits private
employers from excluding prescription contraceptive coverage from plans that provide
comprehensive drug coverage as an “unlawful employment practice.” It confirmed the
December 2000 decision of the EEOC.24 Title VII provides no exemption to religious
employers from providing contraception coverage.
The Erickson case involved a self-insured prescription benefit plan for non-union
employees at the Bartell Drug Company in Seattle, Washington. A female employee,
Jennifer Erickson, filed a suit as a class action representing herself and all affected female
employees of Bartell. Planned Parenthood of America and other named individual
female employees joined as plaintiffs. The court ruled that Title VII requires employers
to recognize the differences between the sexes and provide equally comprehensive
coverage, even if that means providing additional benefits to cover women-only expenses.
The court found that the prescription drug plan discriminates against female employees
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23

Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co. 141 F. Supp2d 1266 (W.D. Wash 2001). The decision was not appealed.
Employees may sue their employer privately under Title VII but must first file a complaint with the EEOC,
giving it a chance to resolve the matter. Zolman, Ibid.
24
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by providing less complete coverage than that offered to male employees. The decision
noted that, “Although the plan covers almost all drugs and devices used by men, the
exclusion of prescription contraceptives creates a gaping hole in the coverage offered to
female employees, leaving a fundamental and immediate healthcare need uncovered.”25
Title VII did not mandate prescription drug coverage, it focused on gender inequity. It
did not require that the health plan cover all FDA-approved contraceptives if there were
no prescription drug plan offered to employees.
The Erickson court was persuaded by the dissent in the Supreme Court case of
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert in finding that Title VII required prescription
contraceptives to be included in comprehensive health plan drug coverage.26 In Gilbert,
an employer provided a short-term disability policy to all employees, which excluded
coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities. The majority found that, because the policy
covered the same illnesses and conditions for both men and women, it provided equal
coverage, even though pregnancy-related disabilities were left out. The majority
reasoned that pregnancy discrimination is not the same as gender discrimination. The
dissent argued that exclusion of this type of coverage for women was unlawful
discrimination because women are the only sex at risk for pregnancy and so the
comprehensiveness of the coverage for women was lacking. The effect of this decision
was harmful and potentially very expensive for women.
Two years later, in 1978, Congress agreed that this was overt discrimination
against female employees and amended Title VII with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25
26

!

Erickson, 141 F. Supp2d 1266, 1277.
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976)
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(“PDA”).27 Congress intended to correct the narrow interpretation of Title VII excluding
contraception by General Electric Co., and to embrace the dissent’s broader
interpretation of Title VII. That interpretation recognized there are sex-based differences
between men and women, which require employers to provide women-only benefits such
as contraception in order to treat the sexes the same.28
Judge Robert Lasnik, in applying the new interpretation of Title VII to employee
benefit plans, said, “The goal of Title VII is to end years of discrimination in employment
and to place all men and women, regardless of race, color, religion or national origin on
equal footing in how they were treated in the workplace” and that this now “includes the
benefits that an employer provides to its employees.”29 Judge Lasnik went on to order the
employer to amend its benefit plan to include prescription contraception coverage as well
as contraception services on the same terms that other drugs and other outpatient services
are covered under the plan.
The Erickson decision had a profound influence on the movement to cover
prescription contraceptives by providing a legal and philosophical basis for state law
mandates to prohibit employers from excluding contraceptive drug coverage in their
comprehensive drug benefits plans.30 This was true even though, technically, a judicial
decision of the District Court only applies to the parties named in the complaints.
Nevertheless, Erickson provided a legal precedent for the first time, for employees, as
individuals and as a class, to bring a lawsuit under Title VII and ask the federal court
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27

Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. sec 2000e(k) et seq.

28

Erickson, 141 F. Supp2d 1266, 1270

29

Erickson, Ibid, 1269, 1271.

30

Zolman, Ibid p.23,24
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directly to order the employer to include contraceptive coverage in the prescription drug
plan. A number of large employers and major universities voluntarily added
contraceptive coverage to their plans as a result of this decision.31

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31
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Chapter 2
The Mandate and Antidiscrimination Laws
After Erickson, many states created their own contraception mandates to be
included in insured benefit plans under their authority to regulate insurance. By 2006,
more than half the states had enacted laws containing state contraception mandates, most
amending their state insurance codes, which provided more effective enforcement than
individual lawsuits. However, these state mandates did not extend to self-insured plans
because of “ERISA preemption,” which gives federal law the sole authority to regulate
these plans.
Since ERISA did not impose any contraception requirements on self-insured plans,
and since the states were preempted from doing so, then the plans would not be subject to
any contraception mandates at all, creating a “loophole” in the eyes of advocates who
wanted these plans to include them. However, after Erickson, employees now had a
remedy, which was to ask a federal court directly to grant relief under Title VII. But
there was a feeling among advocates that this was not enough, as they believed that many
employers would not change their plans voluntarily and would wait for enforcement.32
After Erickson there was another avenue to pursue, which was to enable state fair
employment laws to stop discrimination in these plans and therefore creating an “indirect
mandate” linked to discriminatory practices. Allowing existing state fair employment
laws to enforce Title VII would create a more powerful and effective means of
enforcement than case-by-case litigation, but the ERISA loophole had to be overcome.33
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32

Zolman, Ibid.

33

Zolman, Ibid. p. 24, fn 284, p.53 citing Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for
Contraception, 73 Wash. L. Rv. 363 (1998) at 397-399.
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ERISA is a federal law that regulates all employee benefit plans with the goal of
protecting the interests of participants and their beneficiaries.34 It does not require, by its
very nature, that employee benefit plans include specific benefits of any kind, including
contraception coverage, as it is neutral with regard to benefit provisions.35
ERISA preemption was intended to be very broad and to prevent any state
regulation of employee benefit plans, creating only very limited exceptions to
preemption.36 The reason for preemption was simply to eliminate the threat of conflicting
or inconsistent state regulation of employee benefit plans, which are important to the well
being of Americans. So for the sake of uniformity, ERISA regulates benefit plans but
carves out a niche for the states to exercise their regulatory power in the traditional areas
of insurance, banking and securities.37 States have full authority under this ERISA
exception, to regulate an insurance company’s health plans and may mandate what
provisions those plans will include.
Title VII originated as a civil rights law coming in the midst of the Civil Rights
movement in the South, and was primarily about racial fairness for blacks, not gender
equity for women.38 It is directed at discrimination in the “compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex or national origin.” For the Erickson decision to apply Title VII to benefit plans to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34

US Dept of Labor http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/history.html (accessed 3/4/14)

35

Shaw v. Delta Airlines 463 U.S. 85,90; Zolman Ibid, p. 25 fn 289; This all changed, of course, with the
enactment of the ACA in March 2012.
36

Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc, 463 U.S. 85, 102, 99 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983)

37

29 U.S.C. sec. 1144 (b): “Except as provided in subparagraph (B) nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking or
securities.”
38
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require women-only prescription contraceptives was something new, but not completely
new, as the PDA in 1978 had already broadened interpretation of Title VII to include
women-only disability coverage for pregnancy.
ERISA cannot, by its terms, preempt another federal law. This became an issue
when the federal district court in Erickson interpreted Title VII to apply to these benefit
plans as well, creating an overlap in jurisdiction between two federal laws.39 This was
made more complex by the nature of Title VII, which works together with the states as
part of its overall regulatory scheme. Historically, states have played an important role in
enforcing Title VII through their enactment and enforcement of state fair employment
laws. If state employment laws, channeling Title VII, are to enforce and regulate selfinsured benefit plans, an argument must be found to overcome the ERISA preemption of
these laws. A Supreme Court case from 1983, decided before Erickson, considered this
same preemption issue under the PDA.40
The Supreme Court in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines41 (1983) looked at the issue of
whether ERISA preempts state fair employment laws seeking to enforce the PDA by
preventing sex discrimination in self-funded benefit plans. 42 Delta Airlines provided a
disability benefits plan for employees, which excluded disabilities related to pregnancy.
State fair employment laws required that the plan be changed to include insurance
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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coverage for these disabilities. The Court in Shaw found that pregnancy disability under
Title VII (the PDA amendment) must be treated like any other disability and given the
same benefits and allowed enforcement of Title VII through the New York Human
Rights law.
In so doing the court found that ERISA preemption would not apply to those state
laws that are consistent with and promote the goals of Title VII and therefore are properly
enforcing it. On the other hand, it would apply to (and therefore would preempt) those
state laws that go beyond what Title VII requires or are inconsistent with it. They would
not be considered a proper enforcement of Title VII. It was a practical solution, which
found “partial preemption” and was aimed at keeping the state and federal regulation of
the same subject in harmony.
A concern of the court in Shaw was that, if the state laws were not preempted,
then Title VII could not be enforced at all, and if not enforced, there would be no other
remedy to correct the discrimination in the plan. The net result would be a less effective
enforcement of Title VII.43 The Court concluded that, “[given] the importance of state
fair employment laws to the federal enforcement scheme, [ERISA] preemption of the
[state] human rights law would impair Title VII to the extent that the Human Rights law
provides a means of enforcing Title VII’s commands.”44
Whether the “partial preemption” standard of Shaw may be followed to overcome
the ERISA loophole depends on whether the direct Title VII remedy in Erickson is now
considered sufficient because it was not available in Shaw, and if so, whether there is still
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a need for state unfair employment laws to play a part.45 It may also depend on the
influence of the Erickson decision as precedent. Between 2000 and 2007 the Erickson
decision was considered by a small group of federal district courts, and some adopted its
reasoning while others did not. 46 Erickson was not appealed so there is no ruling from
the Ninth Circuit.
In 2007, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Union Pacific Railroad
Employment Practices Litigation, declined to follow the Erickson holding and the
December 2000 EEOC ruling and held that there was no violation of Title VII (amended
by the PDA) because the sexes were treated the same with respect to contraception
benefits.47 It noted that neither the Circuit courts nor the Supreme Court had considered
whether the PDA applies to contraception, in addition to pregnancy, and then found that
it did not. The court stated that the coverage provided to women was not less favorable
than the coverage provided to men, so there was no discrimination. The dissent argued
that there was discrimination because a benefit exclusion which appeared to be gender
neutral actually had a negative impact on women.
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The case was considered so important nationally that Senate majority leader
Harry Reid (D-NV) and 29 other federal lawmakers signed an amicus curiae brief urging
the Eighth Circuit to make contraceptive coverage mandatory under Title VII.48
In any event, outside of the Eighth Circuit, self-insured plans which avoid
contraception coverage under the state mandates may still subject to Title VII as of the
Erickson decision in 2001 and they may also be subject to state unfair employment laws
if not preempted. If these plans want to avoid Title VII they must discontinue
comprehensive prescription drug plans altogether, even though that may not be in the best
interest of employers and their employees. In 2006, two states created state contraception
coverage mandates by administrative ruling under their antidiscrimination laws, which
were worded similar to Title VII, citing Erickson.49 But both states are outside the
Eighth Circuit and not subject to its precedent.
In July 2009 the EEOC in Charlotte, NC sent a letter to Belmont Abbey College,
a small private Catholic college founded by Benedictine monks, advising it that it
violated Title VII (amended by the PDA) because its employee benefits plan did not
provide contraceptive coverage. The EEOC had not issued a final determination in the
case by February 2012 when the president of the College gave testimony, along with
other religious leaders, before the House Oversight Committee against the HHS
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contraception mandate.50 Belmont Abbey is currently a litigant seeking a religious
exemption from the mandate.51
There is some debate about whether a religious employer could raise RFRA as a
defense to a Title VII claim by an employee that it must provide contraceptive coverage
in its plan.52 At the oral argument of Hobby Lobby, the Solicitor General Mr. Verilli said
that he believed that a RFRA exemption could be sought from Title VII.53
Once a direct contraception coverage mandate applicable to employer-sponsored
plans was created in 2011 by HHS regulation, employees whose plan failed to include
coverage for contraception did not have to resort to Title VII and state antidiscrimination
laws, as long as the mandate applied to their particular plans. The ACA provided means
for enforcement against plans that were not in compliance.
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Chapter 3
The State Insurance Law Mandates
Starting in 1998, the states began to experiment with both incremental and
comprehensive approaches to address the issue of contraceptive equity through their
power to regulate insurance, in particular, employer-sponsored group insurance.
California introduced such legislation as early as 1994, but the first state to enact a law
mandating contraceptive coverage was Maryland in 1998.54 Within six years (by 2003),
twenty states had enacted a mandate. By 2006, eight more states had enacted a mandate,
but there has been no additional state legislation since then.55
Today, a total of 28 states require insurers that cover prescription drugs to
provide coverage of the full range of FDA-approved contraceptive drugs and devices.56
There is no state stand-alone direct mandate requiring employers to provide employees
with contraceptive coverage, only that if prescription drugs are covered as a benefit,
contraception must be included. This is similar to the “indirect” mandate under Title VII.
The federal government has the power to regulate employee benefit plans of
private employers under ERISA, but the states are permitted to regulate plans covered by
insurance as an exception to ERISA preemption. The states are not uniform in their
approach; they have all taken their own path to mandating contraception coverage.
However, a few conclusions can be drawn about their various approaches to the mandate.
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Of the 28 states, 20 states allow exemptions for qualifying employers and insurers
in order to accommodate their religious objections to contraception. The other 8 states do
not permit any refusal by insurers or employers and thus provide no exemption
whatsoever. That leaves 22 states that have chosen not to impose a mandate, but health
plans in those states may still include such coverage voluntarily. The lack of a mandate
in these states has been a matter of concern for contraception coverage advocates.
Based on the results of the 2012 presidential election, the states broke down along
political lines with respect to the mandate. Since there was so activism on either side of
the issue, the political influence on legislative decision-making could not be avoided.
The greatest number of states with mandates (21) were Democrat-voting (blue) states and
only 7 were Republican-voting (red) states.57 Of these conservative states, almost all
adopted the most expansive exemptions for religious employers. The top 10 liberal states
according to Gallup were all included in the mandate, whereas the top conservative states
were not, except for two, Arkansas and Montana. Of the 8 states that allowed no refusal,
6 were blue and only 2 were red.58
Eight states directly address the issue of contraceptives versus abortifacients,
which has become an important issue in this debate, and is at the center of the Hobby
Lobby religious objection.59 Among the FDA-approved contraceptives are several that
religious objectors consider abortifacients operating post-conception to prevent
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implantation of the embryo. This has given rise to claims that the line is being blurred
between birth control and abortion. 60 These eight states accommodate religious
objections by specifically not including prescription abortifacient drugs or devices as
contraceptives, and a few in this group exclude well-known abortifacients by name.61
None of the states require that contraceptive coverage be provided for free. The
most common provision is that copayments or cost sharing for contraceptives not exceed
the same types of charges for comparable services.62
The 20 states which allow exemptions to the mandate fall into three categories of
“limited,” “broader,” and “expansive” based on how much flexibility they give to
religious organizations to be exempt from the mandate.63 Of the states that grant
exemptions, half (10) have adopted expansive exemptions, and seven have adopted
broader exemptions. Only three have adopted the most limited exemptions, but these
include the key states of New York and California upon which the ACA exemption is
based.64
An example of the narrowest exemption is California65, where employers must
meet several very specific requirements to be exempt. The definition of who is a
“religious employer” is an entity for which each of the following is true:66
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(a) The purpose of the organization is the inculcation of religious values
(b) The organization primarily employs individuals who subscribe to the faith
(c) The entity primarily serves individuals who subscribe to the faith
(d) The organization is a tax-exempt nonprofit organization under the Internal
Revenue Code. 26 USC 603367
Under this type of exemption, a church-controlled employer must have tax-exempt status
as a religious entity, making it very difficult to fit within the exemption. Essentially, the
organization has to be a church employing and serving only its own members. This
narrow definition has been challenged and upheld as constitutional in New York and
California, as will be further discussed. Religious advocates maintain that this definition
ignores the reality of the mission of the Catholic Church and other churches to serve all
faiths and is instead built upon a Congregational model, which is based on a private
relationship with God does not have the same community outreach as other faiths.68
Examples of “church-controlled employers” which would not qualify are those social
service organizations providing public services such as affordable housing programs, job
development services, domestic violence shelters, homeless shelters, hospice centers,
soup kitchens, and nursing homes.
The “broader” category of states exempts “religious employers” which are either
a “church” as defined in the Internal Revenue Code Sec 3121(w)(3) or a “church-
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controlled organization” as defined in the Internal Revenue Code Sec. 501(c)(3).69
Massachusetts is an example.70 In these “broader” exemption states, under the IRS
definition, church-controlled charitable organizations are exempt from the mandate
unless they receive significant government funding or unless they charge significant fees
for the goods and services they provide to the public.71 Examples of church-controlled
entities that charge fees and therefore would not qualify are adoption agencies and
universities. This exemption allows a religious employer to engage in the worthy social
outreach programs that the strictest exemption does not, so long as the employer is not
making money at it.
The “expansive” category of states goes even further to allow religious
employers or church affiliated organizations (as opposed to “churches” and “church
controlled organizations”) the flexibility to object to the mandate. Delaware is an
example. In that state, a “religious employer”, which is not defined in the law, may be
excluded if the required coverage conflicts with the organization’s “bona fide religious
beliefs and practices.”72 In this category too are the states of Illinois, Missouri and
Washington, which excuse entities with religious or moral objections to contraception or
certain methods of contraception from paying for or covering those services.73
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Interestingly, Illinois alone allows secular for-profit business entities to be
excused on religious grounds, the very point being argued in the Hobby Lobby Stores
case.74
The experience of Missouri, a red state with an expansive exemption, is
instructive because it went too far in 2012 when it tried to change its existing mandate
after the ACA went into effect. The amendment would have changed the mandate to
require health insurers to offer employers policies that excluded contraceptives whether
or not those employers qualified as “religious employers.” The insurance industry argued
that the Missouri law was brought into direct conflict with the ACA mandate and that the
insurers could not comply with two conflicting laws. A federal court in Missouri found
that the amendment was invalid because it was preempted by the ACA75
On the whole, the states with their variety of contraception mandates and
exemptions have been more philosophically willing to accommodate religious beliefs
with health care policy goals than the federal government has. This willingness has
resulted in a lack of controversy and litigation.
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Chapter 4
First Amendment Legal Challenges to State Mandates
The California and New York contraception coverage statutes with the narrowest
exemptions were challenged by Catholic Charities and other religious groups under the
Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the First Amendment in 2004 and 2006. In
each state, the highest court ruled against the challengers, upholding the mandate and the
exemption. The opinions of these state courts contain arguments and discuss cases that
anticipate the issues that are central to today’s contraception mandate legal debate. They
have proven to be influential and are often cited. The California opinion includes a
strong dissent, which is instructive for the arguments against the mandate. The New
York opinion had no dissent but the court below it (Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court) contained a strong dissent, written by the presiding justice.
In Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court76 the California
Supreme Court in 2004, in the first constitutional challenge to any state contraceptive
statute,77 held, Judge Werdegar writing for the majority, that the narrow religious
exemption in the Women’s Contraception Equity Act (1999) does not violate the Free
Exercise or the Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.78 Catholic Charities is a nonprofit organization operated by the Catholic
Church, which provides social services to the general public such as elder care and
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counseling, and ministers to the poor and needy by providing food, clothing and
affordable housing. It is obliged to follow Church teachings, which say that
contraception is a sin and that as an affiliated entity of the Church it cannot be forced to
endorse or facilitate a sin by providing contraceptive coverage to its employees.
Catholic Charities argued that it could not meet, nor could it ever meet, the four
criteria in the exemption, which was drafted so narrowly so as to exclude parts of the
Church organization, which are integral to its mission, such as the work of Catholic
Charities. Therefore this exclusion was unfair and contrary to the First Amendment.
First, its corporate purpose was not to inculcate religious values, it was to offer social
services to promote a just and compassionate society. Second, it does not employ
primarily persons who share its Catholic beliefs, but rather employs a diverse group of
people who share its stated purpose. Third, it does not serve primarily people who share
its Catholic beliefs, but rather serves a diverse group of people of many faiths or no faith.
Fourth, it does not qualify under the nonprofit “religious” organization exemption under
IRC sec. 6033, but does qualify as a “charitable” tax-exempt organization under Sec.
501(c)(3). 79
Catholic Charities made arguments under the Establishment Clause, including the
argument that the statute impermissibly interferes with the autonomy of religious
organizations because it affects religious doctrine and internal church governance, and
courts are incompetent to decide matters of faith. However, its principal arguments were
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that the statute unduly burdens its right of free exercise of its religion.80 The court
disagreed with the arguments, citing the prevailing standard in the Supreme Court case of
Employment Div., Ore. Dept of Human Res. v. Smith.81
The Smith case held that religious beliefs do not excuse compliance with neutral,
generally applicable laws, as opposed to laws that expressly single out religious practices.
The right of free exercise does not relieve an individual from complying with a “valid
and neutral” law of general applicability even if the law has the “incidental effect” of
burdening a particular religious practice. To permit religious beliefs to excuse acts
contrary to law “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to
the law of the land and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”82
In creating this standard of review for laws of this type, the Smith court found
inapplicable the standard of “strict scrutiny” used in prior United States Supreme Court
decisions.
The standard of “strict scrutiny” requires the state to show that a law substantially
burdening a religious practice must be “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling state
interest.”83 Strict scrutiny puts the burden on the state to justify its law so as to minimize
any impact on religious practice. What exactly is a “compelling state interest” and what
are the “least restrictive means” to achieve that interest are matters that must be examined.
What exactly is a “neutral” law is also a matter of debate. But where a law is neutral and
of general applicability, the rule of Smith does not require the state to make this showing.
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The Smith case uses a “rational basis” standard instead which has been described as a
“standard that places an almost insurmountable burden” on the religious claimant.84
The Smith case involved a 66-year old Klamath Indian who was fired as a
counselor at a private drug abuse and treatment center because he admitted to the
program director that he had ingested peyote at a religious ceremony at a Native
American Church where he is a member. He was fired and then was denied state
unemployment benefits on the basis that he had been discharged for work-related
“misconduct.” There was no evidence that he had showed up for work high, but he
defied the rules of his workplace. All counselors were considered to be role models for
the recovering addicts and were advised that in keeping with the drug-free philosophy of
the treatment center, use of an illegal drug by counselors was grounds for immediate
termination. Possession of peyote, being a hallucinogenic drug, was a felony under the
Oregon criminal code and there was no exemption for religious purposes.
The Smith decision, Justice Scalia writing for the majority, found that it could not
make exemptions to a neutral, generally applicable criminal law and that the
government’s ability to prohibit socially harmful conduct could not be subject to a “strict
scrutiny” analysis. The Court noted an exception to this rule where “hybrid rights” are
present, that is, where there is a combination of a free exercise claim with other
constitutional protections such as freedom of speech and of the press. In that case, but
not on the Smith facts, strict scrutiny would be applied.85 The Court’s concern was that,
given the diversity of religious beliefs in our society, the Court could not be put in the
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position of determining religious objections to key civic obligations of every conceivable
kind because many laws would not meet the compelling state interest test. Then there
would be anarchy.86 The First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty does not
require the fielding of constant challenges to an individual’s “civic obligations” such as
compliance with the criminal law. The Court gave other examples of these types of laws
containing civic obligations, such as compulsory military service, payment of income
taxes, traffic laws, child neglect and child labor laws, compulsory vaccinations, minimum
wage laws, and animal cruelty laws.
The Court was concerned with unity and the preservation of the democratic
process. It may also been concerned with the severe damage that drug addiction inflicts
on society, although there was no evidence that peyote was abused by these Native
Americans as a recreational drug. It concluded that leaving accommodation of religious
practices to the political process is preferable to a system in which each conscience is a
law unto itself or a system where judges must constantly weigh the social importance of
laws against religious beliefs.87
The dissent, written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, argued that is exactly what judges are supposed to do – weigh the goals of laws
against religious beliefs. The dissent, applying the strict scrutiny test of Sherbert v.
Verner, which the majority rejected, would have found the mandate lacking. In doing so,
it found that it is not the state’s broad general interest in fighting the “war on drugs” but
the state’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the religious use of peyote
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86

Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887-888.

87

Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890. The Court stated that the Oregon legislature should enact an exemption for
sacrificial peyote like other states have done.

!

35!

that is important. When competing interests are weighed, they must be reduced to the
same “plane of generality” or else the weighing would be distorted in the state’s favor.88
It noted that the purpose of any law may be traced back to one of the fundamental
concerns of government - public health and safety, peace and order, defense and revenue,
and the general welfare. An abstract or symbolic interest is not sufficient to justify
enforcing a law burdening religion. Therefore the state’s interest in enforcing its drug
laws against the religious use of peyote is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh the
individual’s right to the free exercise of his religion.
The dissent represented a very strong division on the Court regarding the value of
the strict scrutiny test in Sherbert v. Verner, which it believed should be applicable
outside the unemployment compensation field. The dissenting justices, including Justice
Brennan who wrote the Sherbert majority opinion in 1963, were clearly upset to see years
of precedent rejected by the Court, leading to the dissenting opinion’s remark: “In short,
it effectuates a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Clauses of
our Constitution. One hopes that the Court is aware of the consequences, and that its
result is not a product of overreaction to the serious problems the country's drug crisis has
generated.”89
Interestingly, the three dissenting justices joined a concurring opinion by Justice
O’Connor, which urged that that strict scrutiny must always be applied if any laws, even
facially neutral laws, burden religion because “The compelling interest test reflects the
First Amendment’s mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible
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in a pluralistic society.”90 The majority’s view of the First Amendment was too narrow
and did not allow the religious claimants to even make the argument that they were
burdened so as to qualify for an exemption from the rule. The opinion was actually
closer than it appears, with 4 justices favoring the application of strict scrutiny. But like a
squash match, a close score of 5 to 4 can still be a decisive win. However, the dissenting
justices did not share in Justice O’Connor’s holding to uphold the law because it was the
kind of a law that required uniform application and could not admit any exceptions.
The California Supreme Court, following Smith, declined to examine the statute
based on “strict scrutiny.” Regarding Catholic Charities, the court reasoned that the
statute applies neutrally and generally to all employers, regardless of religion and thus is
neutral, not being targeted at any one religion. The law also has a valid objective and
concerns a matter that the state may regulate, because the state may regulate insurance
policies to prevent gender discrimination.
The court, in a very insensitive statement, found that the statute was valid because
it conflicted with Catholic religious beliefs not directly, but “only incidentally, because
those beliefs happen to make prescription contraceptives sinful.”91 If the Smith standard
allows a court to trivialize religious concerns about matters that are sinful, then it may not
be the best standard to apply in religious accommodation cases because results can be
harsh.
Catholic Charities argued that the statute’s exemption discriminates against any
religious organizations that engage in charitable work, as opposed to work that is purely
spiritual, and so it prefers one kind of religion over another in violation of the
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Establishment Clause, picking and choosing using a form of religious gerrymandering.
The court rejected this argument stating that most religious employers are not against
contraception and the fact that the exemption excludes Catholic Charities does not mean
it is discriminates against them. Since the statute applies to religious and non-religious
organizations equally, there is no preference given to non-Catholic institutions.
The court’s view of Catholic Charities was that it was not really part of a church,
but it was simply a nonprofit public benefit corporation with employees, most of which
do not belong to the Catholic Church. Catholic Charities was not being forced to do
something it considered to be sinful because the harm it was experiencing could be
alleviated by an “opt out.” It could drop prescription drug coverage altogether, which
was not required by the mandate, and this should eliminate concern about religious
burdening. Furthermore, it was free to express its disapproval of prescription
contraceptives and encourage its employees not to use them, so its speech was not
suppressed. This opt out seems very inadequate as it hurts the employees which the
church believes that it has a moral duty to provide for.
Finally Catholic Charities argued that the statute violated the “rational basis” test
because the exemption criteria are arbitrary and wholly unrelated to any legitimate state
interest. The court disagreed, saying that the exemption has the legitimate rational
purpose of accommodating a state-imposed burden on religion. The court did agree that
the exemption criteria of only feeding hungry fellow co-religionists and no one else was a
“problem” which did not appear to support a legitimate state purpose. But that made no
difference since Catholic Charities had conceded it did not meet any of the criteria
anyway. The court essentially told them to “get over it.” The majority was indifferent to

!

38!

a harsh result for the religious claimant, as long as the law was neutral and there was
some kind of an opt-out, however inadequate it may seem.
Judge Brown in his dissent noticed the majority’s indifference to putting a
religious claimant in a position where it is being ordered to do something sinful. He
stated, “instead of being dismissive of the very serious claims presented here, we should
treat them with the highest respect.”92 It pointed out the injustice of applying the Smith
rule under these circumstances. If neutral, generally applicable laws do not have to
survive compelling state interest review, such laws require no justification no matter how
heavy the burden on the religious claimant and how inconsequential the state interest. In
the dissent’s view, the government should not be making distinctions between what parts
of a bona fide religious organization are “religious” and which are “secular” and thus
vulnerable to infringement of religious freedom under the Establishment Clause. The
fact that Catholic Charities can opt out of providing prescription drug coverage altogether
and thereby not be forced to facilitate a sinful practice is not helpful at all, as it forces it
to give up benefits needed by its employees in order to object to contraceptives.
The dissent looked at the big picture and philosophically discussed the value of
protecting religious institutions from gratuitous state interference and emphasized that
they are important to the foundation of our liberal democracy. It theorized that the right
of religious liberty is at least on the same level as antidiscrimination in the constitutional
hierarchy. A desire to prevent discrimination is not the only core value at stake. The
dissent acknowledged that the religiously dictated conduct of churches operating in the
secular world may come into conflict with public policy. That is no surprise. The
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question becomes whether the “coercive force of the law may be brought to bear to
compel a religious organization that holds an alternative view, based on religious scruples,
to support a hostile and competing vision of the good.”93
The dissent stated that to demand that contraception be funded, despite the
church’s well-known objections and to draft a “grudging” narrow religious exception to
accomplish this end indicates that the state is not neutral but has taken sides. Such a
narrow exemption presents such a “crabbed and constricted view of religion that it would
define the ministry of Jesus Christ as a secular activity.”94 The law may not be neutral
because of the unusually harsh result, and if not neutral, it must be subject to strict
scrutiny and would not pass that test.
The dissent also maintained that the Smith decision was not applicable to a case of
this type at all. Smith involved the denial of a benefit to an individual based on a
violation of a criminal drug law. In this case, a religious entity, a church, is being forced
to provide a benefit in violation of its theological objections. Just because the right of
free exercise does not excuse an individual from following a valid and neutral law of
general applicability does not mean that a church would never be relieved of the
obligation to follow such a law. This is an obvious distinction ignored by the majority,
according to the dissent.
The harm to an individual of losing benefits in Smith appears to be much less than
the harm to Catholic Charities in being forced to provide contraception coverage that it
considers sinful. The criminal law prohibiting socially harmful conduct of drug use in
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Smith imposed a key civic obligation and is a different kind of law than the contraception
mandate, which creates a new government entitlement program. In Smith, the Native
Americans were not forced to commit anything they considered a sin, or to discontinue
use of peyote, which was central to their religious ceremonies. They were not even
prosecuted for possessing the drug, a crime that the state of Oregon routinely did not
prosecute. It seems convincing that the Smith case should not have been applied to
Catholic Charities. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which did not grant
certiorari.
In 2006, the New York Court of Appeals in Catholic Charities of the Diocese of
Albany v. Serio,95 followed the California decision and held, Judge Smith writing for the
majority, in a terse opinion with little analysis and no dissent that the Smith case is an
“insuperable obstacle” to any Free Exercise claim against the contraception mandate in
the New York Women’s Health and Wellness Act (2002). 96 The claimants were ten
faith-based social service organizations, eight affiliated with the Catholic Church and two
affiliated with the Baptist Bible Fellowship International. They all provided a variety of
social services to the public and operated hospice centers, nursing homes, and schools.
The court recognized that the heart of the case was the statute’s exemption for
“religious employers,” which was the same for both New York and California. The
claimants, as in the California decision, argued that the definition of “religious employer”
for the exemption to the mandate is unconstitutionally narrow in violation of the
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Establishment Clause, as none of the claimants fit within the narrow definition of
“religious” employer to qualify for the exemption.
The court noted that before the statute became law, the issue of how broad the
exemption should be was debated in the legislature, with supporters of one view
contending that religious organizations should not be forced to violate the commands of
their faith and supporters of the other view saying that that a broader exemption would
deprive “tens of thousands” of women employed by church-affiliated organizations of
contraception coverage. The court noted that this latter view prevailed and that the
legislature had spoken. The court held that under the Smith test the First Amendment has
not been offended because the burden on the claimants’ freedom of religious exercise is
the incidental result of a neutral law of general applicability.97 There would be no “strict
scrutiny” analysis. The court found that any burden on the claimant’s religious exercise
was the “incidental result” of a “neutral law of general applicability.” The law was
neutral because it did not “target religious beliefs” and it was not the law’s “object” to
interfere with anyone’s exercise of religion. Its rather general object was to make
broader health insurance coverage available to women.”98
The court noted that the burden of showing that an interference with religious
practice is unreasonable, requiring an exemption from the statute, is on the person
claiming the exemption. Although the burden is heavy, it should not be impossible to
overcome. Exemptions from the Smith rule should be allowed if the “results are plainly
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inconsistent with the basic ideas of religious freedom,” citing some extreme examples.99
This seems to be quite a heavy burden for the claimant.
The court acknowledged that the burden that the mandate places on religious
practices is serious, but since the mandate does not literally compel the claimants to
provide contraception coverage they can always “opt out.” They do not have to purchase
any prescription drug coverage at all for their employees. As in the California decision,
the religious institutions maintained that this “opt out” still poses a problem because they
feel morally obligated to provide their employees with just wages and benefits. The court
noted that although it may be “expensive or difficult” for employees not to have a drug
plan, the employer could make it up with higher compensation.
It was important to the New York court, as it was to the California court, that
many of the claimants’ employees did not share their religious beliefs. The court made
the following revealing statement of its philosophy:
“The employment relationship is a frequent subject of legislation, and when
a religious organization chooses to hire nonbelievers it must, at least to some
degree, be prepared to accept neutral regulations imposed to protect these
employees’ legitimate interests in doing what their own beliefs permit.”
This sounds like a lecture to the claimants who, having failed at the very difficult task of
proving an exception to the mandate, must now accept the burden of a direct
contravention to their core religious beliefs because other people have “legitimate
interests,” too.100 They must be made to see the reasonableness of the court’s decision,
even if they do not agree with it. Yet to the extent that a religious entity is an employer,
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and an offensive federal mandate is placed on the employment relationship, a natural
conflict is created. Where do the organization’s duties lie? These two roles create a
conflict. When viewed purely as an employer, a religious entity is expected to abide by
the secular culture, but it cannot do so at the expense of its core values, because it is also
a religious entity.
An effect of the mandate, whether intended or unintended, is to intrude into the
employment relationship and pit the employee against the employer. This obscures the
real issue, which is the state burdening the religious freedom which is the right of every
citizen. The undercurrent is that a religious entity sincerely opposed to contraception is a
heartless employer denying government-defined basic health care to its employees
because of its strange and outmoded religious beliefs and practices that have no place in
today’s secular world. This cultural belief pits citizens against each other. The problem
with the Smith test is that the government is not challenged to find the least restrictive
means, so religious freedom is never accommodated.
Presiding Judge Cardona, in his dissent in the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court below made several arguments against the mandate and opt outs that presage later
objections to come. Several are similar to the dissent in the California decision, which
was cited in the New York Appellate Division dissent. The dissent noted the adverse
social effects of the decision. The exemption is overly strict in defining a religious
employer, which can result in a smaller, rather than larger, number of women receiving
coverage. Non-exempt religious employers will be forced to take the opt outs. This will
make the situation worse for employees of non-exempt religious employers who do not
qualify for the exemption because they could lose their drug coverage altogether. This
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undermines the state interest in promoting preventive health care for women. In contrast,
employees of exempt religious employers may obtain contraception coverage at low cost
by alternate means.101 The dissent noted that an earlier version of the law contained a
broader exemption, but the added cost, even a small one, was rejected as a too much of a
barrier to contraception coverage. The drug opt out has other problems for the religious
employers as not only violates the moral duty to care for employees, but also penalizes
the employer financially since competitive employers must provide benefits packages.
The dissent maintained that the exemption violated the Establishment Clause,
following the dissent in the California decision. The activities set out in the exemption
reflect the legislature’s determination of what is “religious,” with all the rest of the
entity’s activities being “secular.” An organization is not automatically secular if it
engages in these activities and a decision of what is secular or religious is not is not an
appropriate matter of inquiry for the legislature. The dissent noted that the government
should not discriminate “between those religious institutions that create separate legal
entities for their ecclesiastical and ministerial activities and those religious institutions
that do not.”102
The dissent noted, anticipating a future course of events, that religious employers
may choose to self-insure and be free of state insurance regulation altogether.
The dissent also found that the statute fell within the “hybrid” exception to Smith
because in addition to the free exercise claims the claimants presented another viable
First Amendment claim of free speech and therefore would apply a review of “strict
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scrutiny” to the law. It found no compelling state interest because the statute encourages
the non-exempt religious employers to opt out of prescription coverage as “the principal
way to avoid compromising their religious beliefs.”103 Therefore the state’s interest in
contraceptive coverage for women bears little relation to the statute which is not narrowly
tailored to expand benefit coverage for women and instead is drafted in an “all or nothing”
manner.
Constitutional challenges by groups with strong religious objections to the state
mandates have been limited only to the California and New York narrow conscience
clauses, and as of April 2014 there has been no such political upheaval in the states with
broader, more accommodating conscience clause within their mandates. 104
RFRA, enacted in 1993, and not mentioned in the state decisions because it does
not apply to the states, rejected the Smith case with its harsh results burdening religious
exercise and reinstituted the strict scrutiny test of Sherbert v. Verner. The California and
New York courts were well aware that Congress had rejected the Smith standard at the
time these decisions were handed down in 2004 and 2006. Most certainly, the results
would have been different if a strict scrutiny test had been applied.
The effect of the decisions was to drive more large religious employers to selfinsure or drop prescription drug coverage altogether, which would result in less, rather
than more, access to contraception coverage. Catholic organizations in New York, as the
dissent in the New York decision predicted, chose either to self-insure or to opt out of all
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prescription drug coverage for its employees.105 These included the Archdiocese of New
York, the Archdiocese of Brooklyn and all the Catholic Charities organizations within
their territories. Many large Catholic institutions in California, such as hospitals, decided
to self-insure as well. This still presented a problem for smaller employers who could not
afford to self-insure, and some dropped prescription coverage entirely.
Based on the EEOC complaint against Belmont Abbey, these religious nonprofits must have been aware, at least as of July 2009, that they could still be subject to a
Title VII lawsuit or state antidiscrimination enforcement action if their plans offered
comprehensive drug coverage that did not include contraceptive coverage. The present
official position of the EEOC, according to its website, is that the PDA prevents
discrimination by requiring that a benefit plan provide the same insurance coverage for
contraceptives as it does for other drugs.106
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Chapter 5
The ACA and HHS Mandates
The New Broad Mandate for Contraception Coverage
With the enactment of the ACA, contraceptive coverage advocates finally
achieved the overall general legislative mandate applicable to all employers that they had
been working toward for so many years. This is what the EPICC had tried to do but did
not succeed. The ACA changed the landscape of the health insurance market by directly
regulating both group health plans and group health insurers.107 It amended ERISA, the
Public Health Service Act, and the Internal Revenue Code to accomplish its goals.108
Health care reform was a major topic as early as the 2008 Democratic presidential
primaries. Each of the candidates, Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) and Senator Barack
Obama (D-IL), each proposed their own plan to cover the millions of uninsured
Americans. In the general election, candidate Obama campaigned, among other things,
on the promise of universal health care.109 In February 2009, immediately after his
inauguration, President Obama announced in a joint session of the Democratic-controlled
Congress his plans to work for health care reform. By March 2010 the passage of the
ACA made that reform a reality.110
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On March 23, 2010 President Obama signed the ACA into law as the centerpiece
of his domestic agenda.111 The ACA established a minimum standard of quality health
care for all Americans by requiring “minimum essential coverage” to be included in all
plans, including “preventive services.” The HHS Secretary was directed to promulgate
rules defining which “preventive services” would become part of this mandate.
Contraception coverage was determined by HHS regulation to be part of the mandated
list of preventive services especially for women, with the result that a mandate for
contraception coverage was included in all plans. This mandate came to be known as the
“HHS contraception mandate.”
The HHS Secretary modeled its contraception mandate and conscience clause on
the narrow exemptions in the California and New York state mandates and, not
surprisingly, was met with similar strong opposition from religious groups.
The HHS contraception mandate and the state mandates differ in several
important respects. Unlike the state mandates, the ACA does not specifically require by
its terms that contraception coverage be included in all group health policies. Instead, as
noted, it contains a much broader and far-reaching mandate for “minimum essential
coverage” to be included in those policies. Unlike the state mandates, the ACA prohibits
any cost sharing for preventive services, based on the belief that cost is a barrier.
Another major difference is that the opt-outs available to religious objectors under the
state mandates of dropping prescription drug coverage from the plan or self-insuring are
no longer available, as all plans must comply with the mandate. Employers have only the
choice of dropping their health plan altogether, and paying a heavy fine, making that
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choice painful both for themselves and their employees, who will be driven to the state
exchanges. The limited choice to objecting religious employers is that to either pay for
(or enable) contraception or pay a fine. If they keep their plan but do not comply with the
mandate, the fines go up even higher for non-compliance. In the eight states that allow
no exemption at all, it has been suggested that religious employers have always relied on
self-insurance to obtain relief from the mandate. This opt out will no longer be available,
and even the HHS exemptions may not help them.112
Finally, unlike the state mandates, the HHS contraception mandate is not an
antidiscrimination mandate. It is a direct mandate for coverage, and does not depend on
whether an employer is providing a comprehensive prescription drug benefit that
excludes prescription contraceptives.
State mandates may continue to apply to plans which are exempted from the HHS
mandate, for example, plans which are grandfathered and small employers..113
The net result is that under the ACA, the contraception mandate became broader
and more far-reaching than ever before, with the same narrow exemptions and very
limited options available to religious employers whose beliefs do not permit them to
comply.
The ACA’s goal was to fundamentally reform the American health care system to
provide access to quality insurance for all, but from the start it was met with significant
political and legal objections and long after passage remained the subject of contentious
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debate. Such a large, complex and far-reaching piece of legislation passed without a
single Republican vote, and many lawsuits were filed. The litigation eventually led to a
constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court to two key provisions of the law - the
“individual mandate” and Medicaid expansion.114
The “individual mandate” required most Americans to maintain "minimum
essential" health insurance coverage or else to pay a penalty under the Internal Revenue
Code. It commenced as of March 31, 2014. In March of 2014, HHS quietly issued a
“technical bulletin” containing a broad opt-out exemption to October 2016 for individuals
whose coverage was cancelled for non-compliance with the ACA if they find “other
options” to be more expensive.115 Many individuals would receive the required coverage
through their employer. 116 According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, 78 percent of
covered workers in 2013 were enrolled in a group health plan.117
The Supreme Court upheld the federal government’s authority to impose the
individual mandate as a constitutional exercise of Congress’ taxing power.118 The Court
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also held that the federal government does not have the power to order individual people
to buy health insurance, so the individual mandate would therefore be unconstitutional if
read as a command. However, it does have the power to impose a tax on those without
health insurance.119
In addition to the individual mandate, the ACA also imposed an “employer
mandate” which, like the individual mandate, did not directly compel the purchase of
health coverage, but if employers did not provide “minimum essential” health coverage
to their full-time employees they would be subject to a very large penalty under the
Internal Revenue Code called an “assessable payment,” which has also been referred to
as an “employer responsibility payment.”120 This payment is technically a tax. The
requirement of maintaining minimum essential coverage is the same for the employer and
the individual mandates.121 Like the individual mandate, it is subject to exemptions.122
The ACA’s provision for coverage of “preventive health services” requires all
private group health insurance plans and insurers to provide coverage for free, at no cost
sharing, for “preventive” services such as immunizations, cancer screening, vaccinations,
prenatal care, and, specifically for women, “additional preventive care and screenings” as
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provided by guidelines to be issued by HRSA, an agency within HHS.123 It is directed to
the plans themselves, not the employers, and amends the Public Health Services Law
rather than the Internal Revenue Code where the employer and individual mandates, with
their fines for noncompliance, are based.
HHS, through HRSA, adopted comprehensive guidelines, which it commissioned
from the Institute of Medicine (IOM), part of the semi-private National Academy of
Sciences. The IOM issued guidelines which require group health insurers to provide
“contraceptive methods and counseling” coverage without cost sharing.124 This included
“all FDA-approved contraception methods, sterilization, and patient education and
counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.” These guidelines were part of a
full package of preventive services for women, including well woman visits, diabetes and
HIV testing, STD and domestic violence counseling, and breastfeeding support.125
Abortion services are specifically not included as part of the mandated essential
health services.126 However, in the eyes of many, certain methods of contraception are in
fact abortifacients.127 There is an ongoing medical and scientific debate about how
certain contraception methods actually function. Evidence points to the view that drugs
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such as Plan B and the newer more effective drug Ella have the ability to function by
preventing ovulation, but they also work by preventing implantation of the embryo.128
How much of the time they function as true contraceptives is also a matter of debate,
some saying it can depend on the individual woman. Of the 20 FDA-approved methods
of contraception, there is a view that four of these can function as abortifacients –two
types of IUD’s, and the “emergency contraceptives” Plan B (morning after pill) and Ella
(week after pill). Ella (Ulipristal) is chemically similar to the controversial abortion pill
RU486.129 The FDA recognizes the possibility that the drugs may prevent implantation
and requires warning labels with this disclosure on the drug packages. This is important
to the many women who will not use birth control that acts after fertilization.130
Many religious objectors believe that human life begins at conception and that
any drug or device which prevents a fertilized egg from implanting in the uterus will
destroy a human embryo. However, federal law does not classify the drugs as
abortifacients because such law “defines pregnancy as beginning at implantation.”131
Therefore, according to the government definition, even if the drugs fail to prevent
conception, if they prevent implantation they do not terminate a pregnancy and do not
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cause abortion. Secretary of HHS Kathleen Sebelius testified before Congress that the
HHS mandate does not apply to abortifacients.132
The Mandate Encounters Religious Resistance
HHS issued the regulation (the “interim final rule”) on women’s mandated
preventive care incorporating these guidelines on August 1, 2011. Enforcement was
delayed one year to August 1, 2012, as a concession to religious groups who would need
extra time to comply.133 The new regulation mandated that all group health plans and
group health insurers cover FDA-approved contraception methods and sterilization,
including all the controversial abortifacients. 134 This was in effect a mandate to all
religious employers as well who believed they were facilitators, while limiting
exemptions only to houses of worship, which are the same narrow exemptions contained
in the California and New York mandates.
With this new rule, religious groups could no longer avoid the mandate by selfinsuring or using the opt-outs available before the ACA was passed. The only way out
was to drop coverage altogether and pay huge fines. Although the mandate was not new,
the strict across-the-board application of the mandate and elimination of the old opt outs
was new. Religious employers were suddenly hit with the full effect of a mandate that
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they had been able to legally work around for years and had gotten used to as a de facto
accommodation. The mandate in this manner provoked a crisis.
This rule sparked a national outcry by many religious groups, particularly leaders
of the Catholic Church, because it did not exempt “religious non-profits,” with broad
community outreach such as Catholic Charities. Religious non-profits like Notre Dame
University argued that they would be placed in the position of paying for contraception in
violation of the Church’s moral teaching or discontinuing employee and student health
plans in violation of the Church’s social teaching.135
Management of a crisis may be made easier through use of personal relationships
but the parties did not have any good personal relationships to build on. The outcry
marked a new low in the relationship between the administration and the U.S. Catholic
hierarchy, which saw the government’s public policy as directly affecting the Church’s
religious liberty. The relationship had been rocky since the start of President Obama’s
candidacy in 2007, but had gone seriously downhill from the time he was elected.136 With
the release of the new rule, the relationship would continue to worsen, and disagreements
would increase between President Obama and the powerful Timothy Cardinal Dolan,
Archbishop of New York and President of the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops (USCCB). 137 The USCCB and the president became adversaries at a time when
it was in both their best interests to try and find common ground. But it proved difficult
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to do when both sides felt embattled - the president from the overall strong opposition to
the ACA and the bishop from the moral dilemma that Catholic religious employers now
had to face directly and could no longer legally sidestep.
On the day that the new mandate was announced, the USCCB sharply criticized it
for forcing Catholic social service agencies and healthcare providers to provide
contraceptive and abortifacient drugs to employees. The argument was that those
Catholic organizations which would qualify as a ‘house of worship’ under the IRC sec.
6063 still had to meet the other requirements of the test to be exempt, and they could do
this only if they were to stop hiring and serving non-Catholics. The result was that they
would be forced to discontinue their good works in order to fit within the exemption and
avoid the mandate. Cardinal DiNardo, chairman of the USCCB Committee on Pro-Life
activities, deplored this result, and urged new legislation, the Respect for Rights of
Conscience Act, to create a broader religious exemption to the mandate, stating in a letter
that “[employers] should not be forced to violate their deeply held moral and religious
convictions in order to take part in the health care system…138
On November 8, 2011, New York Archbishop Timothy Dolan met with President
Obama without fanfare at the White House to discuss the pending contraception mandate
and a range of issues related to the tense relationship between the administration and the
USCCB.139 The White House downplayed it as “one among many meetings” with
officials of the Catholic Church and the administration, but it was an important meeting
and came one week in advance of the USCCB meeting in Baltimore in which the bishops
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would discuss their new ad hoc committee on religious liberty. That committee would
create the “Fortnight for Freedom” initiative, which would vigorously oppose the
mandate, although with mixed results.
In mid-January 2012 when the president called Dolan to tell him that he was not
expanding the conscience exemption to include religious non-profits, Dolan felt
personally betrayed and let everyone know it.140 He said later in an interview that he and
the president had a productive and “extraordinarily friendly” meeting, and that the
president had seemed earnest when he said that he considered the protection of
conscience sacred. The president did not want the administration to do anything to
impede the work of the church, which he held in high regard. Dolan left the meeting with
his hopes up and then upon hearing the bad news had to tell the president that he was
“terribly let down, disappointed and disturbed.”141 He felt that he had the president’s
word that the mandate would respect the conscience rights of religious non-profits. Now
there was a credibility gap.
On January 29, 2012 Catholic priests around the country read a letter in church
from the USCCB charging the administration with violating the First Amendment and
threatening civil disobedience if forced to conform to the mandate.142 Secular
publications published opinions that the administration had awakened a “sleeping giant”
with a rule that would have “dire political consequences” in an election year.143 Civil
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disobedience was very much a part of the “Fortnight for Freedom” initiative, which was
formally launched in a statement issued by the USCCB on April 12, 2012.
Overturning the contraception mandate was part of a broader initiative of The
Fortnight for Freedom. The Fortnight for Freedom was concerned with several other
public policy issues that the Church believed threatened religious freedom such as
abortion, and gay marriage and adoption.144 The campaign set aside two weeks in the
church calendar starting June 21 each year for events and services in each diocese
nationwide to commemorate the saints who gave their lives defending the faith. It was
intended to be a nonpartisan focus on “freedom of conscience” and protect against
encroachment of “radical secularism.” It gave a focus for Catholic opposition to the
mandate. However, it was criticized by some for strong rhetoric, and not involving the
laity enough.145 There was a view by some Catholics that the laity should help to lead and
that the church hierarchy should not lose track of what was important to the laity.
Given the strong reaction of religious groups, on January 20, 2012, HHS
announced more complicated rules, this time, a delay of enforcement of the mandate (a
temporary “safe harbor”) to give employers more “time and flexibility to adapt to the new
rule.” The delay would not be automatic. Religious non-profits had to “certify” that
compliance with the rule violated their religious beliefs in order to obtain a one-year stay
of enforcement, from August 1, 2012 to August 1, 2013.146 They would also have to
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show that they had a track record of not covering, or trying not to cover, contraceptives in
the past. Despite the protests, the administration allowed the “interim final rule” to
became a “final rule” on February 10, 2012 without any change to the mandate. Instead
of an exemption, the administration now floated the idea of an accommodation.
The Accommodation: Moral Complicity and Practical Politics
On the same day that the mandate became final, President Obama announced that
the administration would issue a new policy that “accommodates religious liberty” while
protecting the health of women, thus offering hope for some relief for the many religious
non-profits left out of the exemption. Religiously-affiliated employers would not be
forced to directly provide contraceptive coverage, the president said. Instead, their
insurance companies would directly provide it for free. 147 This new accommodation
would shift the burden of directly funding contraceptives from religious non-profit
organizations to their health insurers, which must provide the contraceptives free of
charge. 148 According to the terms of the press release, religious employers would not
have to “contract, arrange, pay, or refer for such coverage” because that would all be
passed off to the insurance company.
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The decision angered the USCCB, as well as Catholics who had been generally
supportive of the administration’s policies, such as Democratic senators, because
religious employers were still not given the legal protection of an exemption.149 To many
non-exempted religious employers, the mandate continued to burden their free exercise of
religion. They pointed out that simply shifting costs from the employer to the insurance
company did not accomplish anything because the employer was still involved and the
plan still covered contraceptives. While reserving judgment on the new proposed rule,
and expressing concerns about how it would actually work, Archbishop Dolan cautiously
said that the decision to revise the rule was a “first step in the right direction.”150
The announcement also stated that, “the new policy does not affect existing state
requirements concerning contraception coverage.” This was probably a reference to the
fact that the ACA would leave in place state mandates that allowed greater access to
contraception coverage than federal standards.
In response, 12 new lawsuits by Catholic organizations were filed against the
mandate, bringing the total in 2012 to 43, representing many dioceses, many Catholic
Charities, and universities. The lawsuits, which were filed in federal district courts across
the country, claimed that the mandate violated the plaintiffs’ fundamental religious
liberty.151 The proposed accommodation came under immediate criticism in the press on
the basis that the two goals stated by the Administration were irreconcilable, and if
religious employers were allowed to opt out of the mandate, it made no sense to prevent
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the insurers they hired from opting out as well.152 Ordering private companies to offer a
product for free would inevitably result in higher premiums and religious employers
would still pay for contraception.
Many religious groups that had objected to the original regulations believed that
the accommodation did not change the situation.153 Religious non-profits would still have
to offer health insurance that included contraceptive coverage and insurers would find a
way to shift the costs back to the employer that would end up paying for it. Religious
employers did not want to be involved in any way in the provision of contraceptive
services, whether or not the employer directly paid for the services. The new rule did not
sufficiently remove the “sinful complicity” of the employer.
Further, it was noted that the rule failed to address the situation where an
employer self-insures, which was a serious omission on the part of the administration. In
a large number of cases involving many thousands of employees, there was no insurance
company to shift costs onto, so the accommodation would not work there.154 Many
Catholic employers had already moved to self-insured plans as a result of the state
mandates.
In response to these objections and concerns, HHS announced in March 2012 that
it proposed a rule that would work for religious employers that self-insure and sought
comment from all interested parties.155 The proposed rule, similar to the rule for insured
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plans, was that third party administrators of (TPAs) of self-insured plans would offer
such coverage free of charge to the self-insuring employer as part of the TPA service
itself.
HHS issued the final regulations on July 2, 2013. The Final rule applied to group
health plans and group health insurers for plan years on and after January 1, 2014, which
was when the majority of plan years would begin.156
The final rule announced three changes: (1) a simplified definition of exemption
for religious employers, (2) new accommodations for religiously-affiliated employers
who did not merit an exemption, including special rules for self-insured plans, and (3) a
requirement that both type of employers execute a self-certification in order to opt out.
The religious employer exemption applied immediately to plan years beginning
on and after August 1, 2013. The changes were said to merely “simplify” and “clarify”
the exemption and were not intended to “expand the universe of religious employers that
qualify for the exemption.”157 The new definition of “religious employer” was: “an
organization that is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity and is referred to in
section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code.” The first three
requirements of the definition were simply removed, in order to avoid the public policy
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result of excluding churches that provide educational, charitable and social services to
their communities, not just to their own co-religionists.158
At this point the exemption consisted of only IRC section 6033 that grants taxexempt status only to churches, their integrated auxiliaries, conventions or associations of
churches, and the exclusively religious activities of any religious order. Only
organizations whose primary function was worship and religious teaching would be
exempt from the mandate. Religious non-profits were excluded from the exemption, as
before.
Beginning January 1, 2014 a new accommodation was available for those nonexempt “eligible organizations” that certified they met certain criteria. Employers were
required to sign a certification form called the Employee Benefit Security Administration
(“EBSA”) form 700 – Certification. An employer was required to provide the signed
certification to its health insurer in the case of an insured plan, or its TPA in the case of a
self-insured plan, which then would relieve the employer of responsibility. The form
must be maintained on file by the religious employer for six years and must be made
“available for examination upon request.”
The “eligible organization” would be required to certify that:159
(1) on account of religious objections it opposes providing coverage to some or
all of the contraceptive services required to be covered, and
(2) it is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity, and
(3) it holds itself out as a religious organization; and
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Under the accommodation, an eligible organization does not have to contract,
arrange, pay or refer for contraceptive coverage. The rule was intended to sever any
connection between the payment of insurance premiums and the coverage of
contraception. Instead, the insurer would pay for contraception services from funds that
must be kept separate from the premiums paid by the eligible organization. The new
policy proposed segregation of funds, but was unclear as to whether it would be
completely separate.
According to the guidance accompanying the final rule, issuers have flexibility in
how to structure these payments. Contraception coverage would be cost neutral because
costs of providing contraceptive coverage are balanced by cost savings from lower
pregnancy-related costs and from improvements in women’s health.160 However, just to
be sure, the guidance provides that the payments made by insurers for contraceptive
services are given favorable treatment for their loss ratios so they will be reimbursed.161
There is a separate section on the EBSA form 700 providing additional
representations and acknowledgments for self-insured plans that has proven to be
controversial. This is because of the nature of self-insured plans. If an eligible
organization is self-insured, the employer directly pays for all health services. If the
employer declines to do this, the TPA must become obligated to pay for the contraceptive
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services.162 For the arrangement to work, the employer, using the form, must tell the TPA
that it will not act as the plan administrator. The TPA must then become the plan
administrator and will become legally responsible under ERISA with respect to the
contraceptive services. Shifting of legal responsibility for a self-insured plan occurs
when the employer signs the Form EBSA self-certification and provides it to its TPA,
which may then decide whether it will decline this responsibility or remain as the plan’s
TPA.
The form is quite important, as it is “one of the instruments under which the
employer’s plan is operated under ERISA…” according to the regulations. The
designation of the TPA using this form “ensures that there is a party with legal authority”
to make payments for contraceptive services.163 The form itself states that it is “an
instrument under which the plan is operated.”
Some saw this final rule as innovative because it shifted costs and payments, but
religious non-profits that self-insure saw it quite differently. They saw themselves as
retaining moral responsibility for a sin, which cannot be shifted so easily. They were
morally complicit in that sin because they were still required by the government to be
involved in the delivery of contraceptives to their employees. They rejected the rule
because the accommodation does not accomplish what it purports to do - completely
insulate the eligible organization from having to “contract, arrange, pay, or refer for”
contraception coverage. The very act of objecting to providing contraception coverage
functions as the legal authorization for the TPA to secure the objectionable coverage.
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The final regulation was denounced by religious leaders as an “accounting
gimmick” and an “accounting shell game” which made no substantial change to the
objectionable original rule.164 A broad coalition spearheaded by Catholic and Southern
Baptist leaders charged that the rule threatened religious liberty for people of all faiths.165
In an open letter titled “Standing Together for Religious Freedom” the group charged that
the final rule violated their freedom of conscience. The letter was spearheaded by the
USCCB’s ad hoc committee for religious liberty.
Because the mandate remained unchanged, the focus turned to the complex
accommodations, in particular the self-certification form, which the Little Sisters of the
Poor and dozens of other eligible organizations have objected to.166 Their position was
that they could not sign or send the form because it “designates, authorizes, incentivizes
and obligates to provide or arrange contraceptive coverage in connection with the
plan.”167 As such, it violates their religious beliefs regarding the sanctity of human life.
They would not authorize a third party to perform the very act that they refused to do
themselves, which is to provide religiously objectionable drugs to their employees.168
This would amount to an endorsement of and facilitation of the services.
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The ACA employer mandate imposed severe penalties if coverage is provided
that does not comply with the mandate, so the stakes for religious non-profits could not
be higher. The penalties for plans which are not in compliance by January 1, 2014 are
$100 per affected individual per day.169 If the employer instead drops insurance
altogether, the penalty less but still substantial - $2000 per year for each full-time
employee if no coverage is provided beginning in 2015.170 This lead to the strange result
that the ACA punishes much more heavily for having the wrong insurance than it does
for having no insurance at all.171 The employer mandate was given an additional
extension.172
In the case of the Little Sisters, noncompliance would amount to “millions of
dollars” in fines.173 In the case of Notre Dame, noncompliance would amount to $250
million per year.174 In the case of Catholic Charities, noncompliance would amount to
$140 million in the first year.175 These fines are severe. One could question whether it
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really serves any kind of state interest to destroy the ministry of religious organizations
that serve the public good.
The view of the Little Sisters and others like them is that the self-certification
form is not just a piece of paperwork, it is central to the plan delivery of contraceptive
services, as it provides legal authorization for a TPA to provide contraceptives that are
excluded from a self-insured plan. It is forced cooperation. To others, the form provides
a practical solution that allows the religious employer to “step aside” from having to
provide contraception coverage and lets the federal government identify substitute
providers for that coverage. They saw this interpretation of the form as unreasonable and
far-fetched. The employer would not be enabling anything, as the ACA mandate already
directly required insurers as well as TPAs to cover contraceptive services.176 It was
already their legal responsibility.
After all the negotiations over the mandate and its accommodation, religious nonprofits and the government did not reach agreement because the accommodation,
particularly for the self-insured plans favored by many, still required their facilitation of
something immoral. Continued litigation was likely as the parties were indeed sparring
over a “hostile and competing vision of the good.”177
The University of Notre Dame was one of many religious non-profits to file a
lawsuit in federal court against the contraception mandate, but it was the only one as of
April 25, 2014 to be denied an injunction against the enforcement of the mandate.
Writing for the 2-1 majority in University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, Judge Posner found
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that the plaintiff was given an accommodation under the final rule and must sign the
EBSA form to obtain it. The court stated, “no certification, no exemption.”178 It saw the
form as simply a convenient method to completely shift responsibility to the TPA, and
seemed frustrated that Notre Dame would not take “five minutes” to sign some “boring
boilerplate” and get it all over with.
In his dissent Judge Flaum took a more conciliatory approach but acknowledged
that the problem is not that simple and in some ways may not be best resolved by the
courts. He put it well when he said, “…how best to accommodate the twin demands of
religious faith and secular policy has become a challenging political problem as much as
a legal one,” noting that there is only so much the courts can do in reconciling the
competing demands on government.179 This echoes the concern of the majority in Smith
that, given the diversity of beliefs in our society, courts cannot be put in the position of
constantly weighing laws against religious beliefs and the political process must also take
responsibility for accommodation of religious practices.
The Notre Dame dissent pointed the way out, which is that the parties themselves
must strive to reach a mutual agreement: “Whatever the eventual outcome of this
litigation, it would be unfortunate if it dissuaded either the government or religious
institutions from taking further steps towards mutually acceptable accommodation.”180
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Chapter 6
The For-Profit Challenge to the Mandate
Litigation Against the Mandate
The final HHS mandate neither exempted nor accommodated for-profit employers
in any way, as they do not come within the definitions of non-profit religious
organizations or eligible organizations. The guidance issued with the Final Rule
specifically does not accommodate them.181 This has led to numerous for-profit religious
employers suing HHS Secretary Sebelius under RFRA in a direct challenge to the
mandate. 182 The Hobby Lobby case has argued that for-profit religious employers fall
within the group of religious entities entitled to constitutional protection.
As of April 25, 2014, 96 lawsuits had been filed by both non-profit and for-profit
religious employers in federal district courts challenging the mandate as a violation both
of RFRA and the First Amendment’s guarantee of the free exercise of religion. Religious
non-profits had filed 48 lawsuits representing hundreds of employers (including three
class action lawsuits) claiming that the exemption and the accommodation made by HHS
were not sufficient.183 Since many of these cases were initially filed before the final
mandate was promulgated on July 2, 2013, they needed to be re-filed. Many were
dismissed. Therefore, they were not as far along in the court system as the cases brought
by for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties,
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which reached the Supreme Court first. For-profit religious employers had filed 48
lawsuits, and of these, 33 had been granted preliminary injunctions and six had been
denied. Religious non-profits had won 20 injunctions against enforcement of the
mandate while their cases were being heard and one was denied.
All these cases will likely petition the Supreme Court for review after they are
heard by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, with religious non-profits following a route similar
to the religious for-profits.184 The Supreme Court decision in Hobby Lobby Stores
decision will affect the outcome of all of this litigation.
Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties were separate for-profit
religious employers that filed complaints in federal courts in Oklahoma and Pennsylvania
respectively against the mandate alleging that it forced them to provide coverage for
abortion-inducing drugs and devices in their plans despite their religious objections.
Hobby Lobby has a self-insured plan and Conestoga has an insured plan. They both
brought challenges under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The Hahn family of Conestoga Wood Specialties were Mennonites and the Green family
of Hobby Lobby Stores were evangelical Christians. The Greens had a large business
with about 13,000 employees, which included a chain of Christian bookstores called
Mardel. The Hahns had a much smaller business with 950 employees, but their situations
were similar. They were both closely-held family-owned companies run strictly
according to the religious faith of their owners who maintained that the mandate forced
them to provide and pay for abortifacients contrary to their sincerely held religious
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beliefs or else pay huge fines. However, the federal courts treated their claims very
differently.
Hobby Lobby and Mardel asked for a preliminary injunction on September 12,
2012 to avoid paying crippling fines while the case was pending. The mandate (at that
time) would have required compliance as of January 1, 2013. The district court and a
two-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit both denied
preliminary relief. Hobby Lobby and Mardel sought emergency relief from the Supreme
Court (Justice Sotomayer), which also denied relief. The full court of the Tenth Circuit
then agreed to reconsider the request, with the plaintiffs citing “exceptional importance”
of the issues and issued a decision on June 27, 2013. The court ruled on the RFRA claim
first, finding that Hobby Lobby and Mardel were entitled to bring claims as for-profit
corporations under RFRA and had established a likelihood of success of those claims.
After that finding it stated that it did not need to rule on the Free Exercise claim. The
case was remanded to the district court for decision, which granted the plaintiffs an
injunction. The government petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to
review whether Hobby Lobby and Mardel may bring claims under RFRA. Hobby
Lobby’s Free Exercise claim remained live in the district court pending review. The
petition was granted on November 26, 2013 and consolidated with the petition of
Conestoga Wood Specialties for oral argument on March 25, 2014.
Meanwhile, Conestoga Wood Specialties’ request for a preliminary injunction
was denied by the district court on January 11, 2013 as not establishing a likelihood of
success on the merits of its claims. A stay pending appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit was denied on February 8, 2013, forcing Conestoga, at the insistence
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of its insurer, to comply with the mandate. The district court denied the preliminary
injunction and Conestoga appealed the denial to the Third Circuit. On July 26, 2013 the
court issued a decision that a for-profit secular corporation cannot engage in religious
exercise, nor can it bring a claim under RFRA. In so doing, the Third Circuit took a
different approach from the Tenth Circuit by deciding the constitutional question first.
Conestoga Wood petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review whether
the religious owners of a family business, and their closely held business corporations
have free exercise rights that are violated by the mandate.
Both cases raised challenges to the mandate under RFRA, which was their most
significant claim, but Conestoga also raised a direct Free Exercise challenge to the
mandate.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The major issue of the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood consolidated case is
the right of family-owned for-profit business corporations to bring claims under RFRA, a
statute aimed at preventing federal laws that substantially burden a person’s freedom of
religion.185 RFRA was a non-partisan collaboration by both liberal and conservative
groups seeking to protect First Amendment rights. It passed almost unanimously in
Congress and was quickly signed into law by President Clinton in 1993. 186 RFRA was
enacted to protect religious freedom by requiring the government to demonstrate that
government action placing a burden upon religion is the least restrictive means of
advancing a compelling interest. It protects unpopular and minority religious viewpoints
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and was a rebuke by Congress to the Supreme Court. It is all about the burden on
religious exercise.
RFRA was enacted in direct response to the result in the 1990 Smith case, which
was highly controversial and outraged the public because it placed a substantial burden
on the free exercise of religion particularly as applied to Native Americans.187 The
standard in the Smith case, unlike the RFRA standard, is indifferent to the burden on
religious exercise. The Smith case dramatically narrowed the scope of the Free Exercise
Clause because employers do not have to make any reasonable accommodation for a
religious practice as long as the law is neutral and not targeted at religion.
RFRA reinstituted the “strict scrutiny” of test of Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin
v. Yoder for all Free Exercise claims, which ensured that religious claimants got their day
in court by allowing them to present evidence of how they were burdened. Congress
sought to correct the effects of the Smith decision with RFRA, but as it turned out, it was
only partially successful.
RFRA stated that in Smith the “Supreme Court virtually eliminated the
requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
neutral toward religion.”188 It stated that its purpose was to “restore the compelling state
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder” [citations omitted]
and to “guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened.”189 It recognized that “laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden
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religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise”190 and
that the government should not substantially burden religious exercise without
“compelling justification.”191 Upon showing a substantial burden, RFRA requires the
government to prove that “application of the burden to the person- (1) is in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interests.”192
RFRA significantly provides a “claim or defense” to “persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government.” The question of whether a for-profit
corporation is “person” who may sue for burdening of religious exercise is the major
threshold issue in the Hobby Lobby consolidated case.
However, there is a more recent perception of RFRA, which is that it is a “super
statute” which can be used to block the goals of government entitlement programs such
as the ACA. RFRA is no longer bipartisan, as many now see it as a curb on the
government. Congress structured it to override other legal mandates, including its own
statutes, if and when they encroach on religious liberty.193 All federal laws after
November 16, 1993 are subject to RFRA, unless they explicitly say they are not.
Congress obligated itself to explicitly exempt later-enacted statutes from RFRA, which is
why some case law has analogized it to a constitutional right.194 Congress enacted RFRA
to tame the Supreme Court, but now it has created a rule that it must also follow.
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In 1997, despite RFRA’s tremendous popularity, the Supreme Court in City of
Boerne v. Flores ruled it unconstitutional as applied to the states on the basis that
Congress had exceeded its limited authority to regulate the states under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 195 Congress could not impose the
compelling state interest test on the states and so was a win for federalism. In an
interesting example of checks and balances between the Congress and the Judiciary,
some might even call it a clash, the Supreme Court did not take kindly to RFRA’s
rejection of Smith and let Congress know it could not adopt an interpretation of the
Constitution contrary to the Court. In so doing, Congress had gone beyond the limits of
its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Flores, a Catholic diocese sought to enlarge its church building, located in the
city’s historic district, to accommodate its growing congregation, but zoning laws
prevented it from doing so. The diocese used RFRA to challenge the zoning law. The
Court held that the enforcement power of Congress extended to laws that are “remedial”
or “preventive” only and not laws which make any substantive change in constitutional
protections. Congress changed constitutional protections by rejecting Smith and altering
its holding to create a different standard of review which would create a great deal of
trouble with state laws which could not stand up to such strict scrutiny. The Court
reminded Congress that the federal government has only enumerated powers and should
not be intruding into areas of state responsibility. The Court was unhappy with the fact
that Congress was concerned with the incidental burdens imposed, not the object or
purpose of the legislation.
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The Court made it clear that the power to interpret the Constitution in a case or
controversy is for the judiciary alone, that the Congress should have accorded the Court
more respect for the Smith decision and that the Court in the future would continue to
determine the law based on its own settled principles, including stare decisis and
“…contrary expectations must be disappointed.”196 So the Court let Congress know of
the limits of separation of powers and that this was not the end of it. RFRA was
subsequently amended in 2003 to include only the federal government and its entities.197
Advocates of religious liberty were disappointed in the Flores case because, of
the laws that burden religious exercise, only a tiny fraction of them are federal ones.198
Most religious liberty disputes arise over state and local laws. Now RFRA and cases
decided under it will not apply to these laws. Instead, the Smith case will continue to
provide valid precedent to make religious accommodation cases very difficult. It seems
ironic that the bipartisan RFRA cannot be made to apply to the states, but the strictly
partisan ACA contraception mandate can force the states to comply with its will.199
At present, the HHS contraception mandate has focused all the attention on
federal law to which RFRA applies, but there is a view that the real future of religious
freedom rests with the states.200 Since the passage of RFRA, 16 states have passed state
RFRAs and a number of others already have religious protections in their constitutions,
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for a total of 30 states with protections for religious liberty beyond what Smith
provides.201
In 2006 the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
do Vegetal confirmed the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to federal law when it
held in a unanimous decision that the federal government had failed to make its case
under the strict scrutiny test set out by RFRA for enforcing a federal drug law against a
religious group for use of a prohibited drug. 202 In O Centro, the strict scrutiny test that
Congress created with RFRA came back to bite the government and thwart its objectives.
This irony was not lost on the Court, which noted that the problems encountered with the
strict scrutiny test are the very reason that the Court adopted the Smith rule in the first
place. “Indeed, the very sort of difficulties highlighted by the Government here were
cited by this Court in deciding that the approach later mandated by Congress under
RFRA was not required as a matter of constitutional law under the Free Exercise Clause.
See Smith....”203 The Court was saying, “I told you so.”
In O Centro, the religious claimant under RFRA was a Brazilian Christian sect
organized as a New Mexico corporation that used a sacramental tea called hoasca. The
tea contained a drug designated as a Schedule I controlled substance with a high potential
for abuse and no currently accepted medical use under federal law. Customs agents had
confiscated the tea. The court noted that under the new statutory rule imposed by RFRA a
religious claimant need only show that a law would substantially burden a sincere
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exercise of religion. The government then needed to make its showing of a compelling
state interest advanced by the least restrictive means. The Court found that the
government’s claim that it always has an interest in prohibiting “exceptionally dangerous”
Schedule I substances is too generalized. It must show with particularity how its strong
interest in prohibiting use of hoasca would be harmed by allowing an exemption for the
particular and limited purpose of sacrificial use. The Court found that the government
failed to make this showing.
Further, the Court found that the government’s argument that the Controlled
Substances Act is a closed regulatory scheme which can allow no exceptions and requires
uniformity is undermined by the long-standing exception made for peyote, another
Schedule I drug. The government must demonstrate a compelling state interest in
uniform application of a law by offering actual evidence that granting the accommodation
would seriously compromise its ability to administer the program. The government had
to provide actual proof of harm, not mere “possibility” of harm. A “slippery slope”
argument that any exception inherently undermines a law was derided by the Court as the
“classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I’ll
have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.”204
The Court noted that RFRA operates by mandating consideration of exceptions to
rules of general applicability and the very reason that Congress enacted RFRA was to
respond to a decision denying a claimed right to sacramental use of a controlled
substance.
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Advocates for religious liberty were pleased with the result in O Centro because
the Court made clear that under RFRA the government has a difficult burden to comply
with the strict scrutiny test and must prove its interests, not just assert them. However,
the applicability of O Centro is limited to federal law. Despite the O Centro holding in
favor of religious free exercise, hoasca is still illegal in all of the states except two, as it is
a prohibited drug under the state versions of the Controlled Substances Act.205 A Free
Exercise claim today against a state or local law still requires getting over the substantial
hurdle in Smith.
The Free Exercise Clause
A Free Exercise claim may survive a Smith analysis under the right circumstances,
as demonstrated by the 1993 Supreme Court case of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah cited in both the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood briefs. 206 In
Lukumi, a church organized as a religious non-profit and its members brought suit against
the City of Hialeah alleging that city ordinances targeted and prohibited their religious
practices under the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court,
applying a Smith analysis, found that the city ordinances were not neutral and not of
general applicability, and therefore applied the strict scrutiny standard. The city
government, not surprisingly, failed to meet this standard. The Court held that, “A law
that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate
governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict
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scrutiny only in rare instances. It follows from what we have already said that these
ordinances cannot withstand this scrutiny.”207
The church and its congregants practiced the Santeria religion, which involved
animal sacrifice as one of its principal religious rites. The primitive nature of the religion
combined with animal slaughter was highly offensive and disturbing to many citizens and
provided the Court with an extreme example of Free Exercise to review. The Court noted
that while the nature of the Santeria religion may “seem abhorrent to some, religious
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to
merit First Amendment protection.”208
The city counsel adopted four emergency ordinances to prohibit the “ritual
sacrifice” of animals, but left many exemptions for other types of animal slaughter, such
as that done in certain food establishments (where permitted by zoning), euthanasia,
Kosher slaughter, science experiments, hunting, and fishing. So many, in fact, that just
about the only conduct prohibited was the religious exercise of Santeria.
The Court found the law not neutral, setting out the standard that neutrality
requires first that a law must be neutral on its face. In addition, it must also not have as
its “object” the suppression of religious beliefs. Although the city had legitimate interests
in preventing animal cruelty and promoting the public health, the design of the law
revealed its true object to the Court. It contained a “pattern of narrow prohibitions”
combined with “pattern of exemptions” with the result that only religious slaughter of
animals were prohibited.
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The Court noted that the city’s legitimate interests could be protected in other
ways stopping short of an overbroad flat prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial practice.
The city should have addressed its concerns in narrow laws that are applicable to
everyone. Instead, it chose to prohibit killings motivated by religion.
After the Court found the ordinances not neutral, it was fairly straightforward for
the Court to find that they also did not meet the second requirement of general
applicability. Although all laws are selective to some extent, a law cannot apply only to
religious conduct, which must be treated equally with non-religious conduct. All of
society, not just the religious conduct, must bear the burden.
The Court did not like all the other exemptions for other types of animal killings.
It stated the principle that where the government restricts only religious conduct and fails
to restrict other conduct producing the same sort of harm, the government’s interest will
not be accepted as compelling. If the interest were truly compelling, the state would give
it more protection than it did. “[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the
highest order when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest
unprohibited.”209
Justice Souter in his concurring opinion urged the Court to re-examine the Smith
rule and sided with the four justices who rejected it in favor of more expansive Free
Exercise protection. He put forth the idea that neutrality should be expanded to include
not only “formal neutrality” which only bars laws with an object to discriminate but also
“substantive neutrality” would also require the government to accommodate religion by
providing an exemption from formally neutral laws that create a burden.
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Interestingly, Justice Blackman in his concurring opinion, joined by Justice
O’Connor, said that, “I continue to believe that Smith was wrongly decided, because it
ignored the value of religious freedom as an affirmative individual liberty and treated the
Free Exercise Clause as no more than an antidiscrimination principle.”210 This statement,
made over ten years ago, was prophetic. It identified the clear growing tension between
the principles of the First Amendment and the principles of Equal Protection. An
unfortunate political perception of the First Amendment, perhaps aided by the Court itself,
is that it stands in the way of, rather than protects, individual liberty. Instead of seeing
religious free exercise as protective, some Americans are now regarding it as oppressive
and they fear “religious coercion.”
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Decisions in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood
In Hobby Lobby Stores v Sebelius,211 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the plaintiff’s RFRA claim, finding that for-profit businesses, just like
individuals, can engage in religious exercise because they are “persons” for the purposes
of RFRA. Justice Tymkovich, writing for the majority, would not rule on the Free
Exercise claim, following the principle of judicial restraint that constitutional claims are
decided only when necessary. Since RFRA does not define the word “person,” the court
looked to the Dictionary Act, which defines a “person” for purposes of federal law to
include corporations regardless of their profit making status.
Citing O Centro, the court stated that the Supreme Court has allowed non-profit
corporations to take advantage of RFRA protections and since Congress did not
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specifically exclude for-profit corporations, they come within RFRA’s scope. The court
also found that the Free Exercise clause is not a purely personal guarantee unavailable to
associations and corporations. Individuals may incorporate for religious purposes and
keep their Free Exercise rights through the right of association. The court pointed to the
predicament of an incorporated kosher butcher shop being unable to challenge a law
mandating non-kosher butchering practices. It noted that Free Exercise cannot turn on
Congress’ definition of non-profit tax status. It did not make sense to grant protection to
a corporation under the First Amendment for speech but not for the exercise of religion.
On the merits of the RFRA claim, court found that the mandate imposed a
substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion, because it put substantial
pressure on them to violate their religious beliefs. It does not depend on whether the
burden is direct or indirect, but depends on the coercion the claimant subjectively feels to
violate his beliefs. The sincere belief of the plaintiffs is that life begins at conception and
this belief is burdened by the government’s demand that they provide access to
abortifacients they deem immoral. If the plaintiffs do not comply, they must pay huge
fines, which is itself a clear burden.
The government next had to demonstrate that mandating compliance is the least
restrictive means of advancing a compelling interest. It had to show the particular harm
of granting a specific exemption to a particular religious claimant. The court found that
the asserted interests of public health and gender equity important but not compelling
because they are too broad. Citing Lukumi and O Centro, the court found that the interest
could not be compelling because tens of millions of people had already been exempted
from the requirements of the mandate.
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Regarding least restrictive means, the court found that the government had not
explained how its broad interests would be fundamentally frustrated by granting the
plaintiffs their limited request for an exemption from providing four of the twenty
required contraceptives.
A concern was expressed by the government that Hobby Lobby and Mardel were
imposing their religious views on their employees. The court responded to this concern
by pointing out that the employees are free to purchase the four contraceptives
themselves. The court acknowledged this as an economic burden but noted that
accommodations for religion frequently operate by lifting a burden and then placing it
elsewhere, which the government had already done for other religious employers. The
government must show why the employee’s additional expense creates a compelling
interest that can only be met by requiring the plaintiffs to comply with the mandate.
In Conestoga Wood Specialties v. Sec. of the U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Servs., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the Conestoga and the Hahn
family who challenged the mandate because they did not want to be forced to provide
coverage for two drugs out of the twenty contraceptives that they considered to be
abortifacients. The court found that a for-profit secular business cannot assert a claim
under the Free Exercise Clause and therefore cannot engage in the exercise of religion. 212
Because it cannot engage in free exercise, it cannot assert a RFRA claim. The court then
found it unnecessary to decide whether the corporation was a “person” for purposes of
RFRA. The Hahns had objected to two of the twenty methods of contraceptives in the
mandate- Plan B and Ella, because they did not want to be forced by the government to
provide contraception. The Third Circuit, unlike the Tenth Circuit, addressed the
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threshold constitutional question of whether for-profit corporations have Free Exercise
rights first. The court noted that the First Amendment right of free speech has
historically been applied to corporations, but that the right of free exercise has not. Each
clause of the First Amendment has been interpreted separately and the Free Exercise
clause does not automatically follow the Free Speech clause.
Judge Cowen for the majority stated that religious beliefs take shape within the
minds and hearts of individuals and a for-profit artificial being that was formed to make
money cannot possibly exercise an “inherently human right” like free exercise of religion.
The religious organizations in Lukumi and O Centro were not secular for-profit entities
and so those cases are not convincing. The court drew a line between non-profit and forprofit entities when it comes to free exercise rights. Churches are the means by which
individuals practice religion, not money-making business corporations.
The Hahns created a distinct legal entity with legal rights different from the
natural people who created it and therefore the court would not accept the “pass through
theory” that Conestoga may exercise the legal rights of the Hahns. The court noted that
since Conestoga is distinct from the Hahns, the mandate does not require the Hahns to do
anything. The choice to incorporate determines the right of free exercise, as a corporation
and its owners are separate. The court also held that the Hahns as individuals are not
likely to succeed on either free exercise or RFRA claims because the mandate does not
apply to them, it applies to their company. The penalties under the ACA for plan noncompliance fall on the employer, not its individual owners.
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Chapter 7
The Mandate Reaches the Supreme Court
The consolidated cases of Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores and. Conestoga Wood
Products v. Sebelius were argued before the Supreme Court on March 25, 2014 in the
spotlight of national attention, with political experts from major news sources such as the
Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and National Public Radio commenting on its
significance and even late night television entertainment such as The Daily Show with
Jon Stewart chiming in.213 While national media attention exploded during the days
leading up to and after oral argument, Hobby Lobby had received constant media
attention dating back to the early days when the Green family first began to fight the
HHS contraception mandate in 2012.
The Daily Oklahoman was the first media source to pick up the Hobby Lobby
story on September 13, 2012 just one day after the arts and crafts company filed for an
injunction against the mandate in federal district court in Oklahoma City.214 The Green
family received praise and support for their efforts from members of Congress including
Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK) and Rep. James Lankford (R-OK) who said “federal coercion
to require business to provide free drugs that render abortions clearly violates the
religious beliefs and moral practice of hundreds of thousands of Oklahomans.”215 At the
time, it seemed that this story would only remain important within Oklahoma, where
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Hobby Lobby has its headquarters. No major newspapers besides The Daily Oklahoman
consistently covered the story.
However, all this began to change when Hobby Lobby’s legal counsel, The
Beckett Fund for Religious Liberty, issued a press release when a two-judge panel of the
Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court and also denied preliminary injunctive relief
on December 20, 2012. The release was distributed by the press wire Targeted News
Service and the story began to make national headlines, with the Associated Press
running a brief version of the story the next day.216
Press coverage then increased dramatically on December 26, 2012 when Supreme
Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor also denied Hobby Lobby’s emergency request to block
the enforcement of the contraception mandate, including imposition of heavy fines, while
the case was being litigated.217 Arlington, Virginia-based political journalism website
Politico.com ran an article on Sotomayor’s decision at 6:20pm that very day.218 That
night at 10:25pm CNN published an article on the Supreme Court denial on its website.219
At this point the Hobby Lobby case became a lead subject of the national news cycle.
The very next day Fox News, The Washington Post, The New York Times and
countless other news sources, both small and large, published content on this story of a
first challenge to the mandate. When six months later the full Tenth Circuit handed
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Hobby Lobby a sweeping victory in a decision issued on June 27, 2013, the case became
a constant major news story.
The case of Conestoga Wood developed through the court system on a parallel
course to Hobby Lobby, but about a month behind, and involved the same issues. As a
result, it did not receive as much media publicity. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
denied Conestoga’s request for and injunction on July 26, 2013, almost exactly a month
after Hobby Lobby’s win. When the Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 26,
2013 and consolidated both cases, Conestoga Wood was swept up in the national
publicity about the Hobby Lobby case.
By the time the Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 25, 2014, the
consolidated case was national news of the highest order with interest groups of nearly
every point of view offering analysis and comment. In addition to news articles, many
prominent interest groups submitted amicus curiae briefs to promote their positions.
There were over 90 amicus curiae briefs filed, the great majority (almost 3 to 1) opposing
the mandate, but many in favor, representing all kinds of religious, social and medical
organizations, many Catholic groups, women’s groups, The Guttmacher Institute, the
American Jewish Committee, the ACLU, think tanks, assorted advocacy groups, senators,
universities, and even the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye (the Santeria congregation
that had prevailed in a major Supreme Court free exercise case two decades earlier). 220
There was extensive media coverage of the scene outside at the Supreme Court
leading up to and during the oral argument itself, with passionate demonstrators holding
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up signs like “religious freedom” and “not my boss’s business.” There were women in
pink hats and priests kneeling and praying on the plaza. People were in line overnight
and slept in beach chairs as if they were getting tickets to a rock concert or a play-off
game, rather than a chance to view a scholarly discussion and debate of complex legal
principles. Commentators offered their predictions of the Court’s decision.221 A decision
is expected by late June.

Issues Before the Court
The threshold issue that the Court would have to decide is whether for-profit,
closely held corporations can bring suit under RFRA for an exemption on the basis that
the mandate has placed a substantial burden on their religious free exercise. The
Respondents, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, said yes, they are “persons exercising
religion” for purposes of RFRA.222 Their argument was that RFRA does not separately
define “person,” but the Dictionary Act provides that in interpreting any Act of Congress
the word “person” includes a corporation. RFRA also protects any exercise of religion,
which includes for-profit corporations.
The Petitioner, the government, argued no, RFRA does not grant free exercise
rights to for-profit corporations and the Dictionary Act does not define “religious
exercise.” To allow for-profit companies to sue under RFRA would allow a vast
expansion of the religious exemption Congress intended to create. Congress intended
that under RFRA, free exercise cases decided prior to Smith should provide guidance.
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The Supreme Court has never held that for-profit corporations have religious beliefs,
which are attributed only to churches and religious communities. Therefore RFRA only
protects “individuals and religious non-profit institutions.” Further, a corporation and its
owners are distinct and separate entities and the corporation is not entitled to an
exemption based on the family’s beliefs. There is an important distinction between forprofit and non-profit entities that Congress intended to preserve in RFRA. A for-profit
corporation also cannot make an independent Free Exercise claim for these same reasons.
Based on the comments of the justices at oral argument, the Court would also
have to consider the practical results and common sense of its ruling, not just legal
argument. It would have to consider whether opening RFRA to for-profit corporations
would put employees in a disadvantaged position if the corporation has religious
objections to critical health care like vaccinations or blood transfusions.223 If too many
employers can opt out, then medical coverage would be piecemeal and nothing would be
uniform.224 On the other hand, for-profit corporations will be disadvantaged if they could
not make RFRA claims. A small, incorporated kosher market would have no remedy
against a law that prohibits kosher slaughter as inhumane, like a recent law in
Denmark.225 A for-profit corporation could be forced to pay for abortions, which is the
case before the Court.226 If religious people associate in an enterprise, the Court must
consider whether it would matter if they called themselves individuals or called
themselves a corporation227
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The Court would have to consider whether to treat the case primarily as a
statutory case under RFRA or as a First Amendment case.228 The Respondents wanted
the case to be decided on the basis of RFRA alone. It would make a difference because
RFRA may have a stricter standard of review than the pre-Smith cases. The government
favored an interpretation of RFRA that requires guidance of and reference to these cases,
which would avoid strict scrutiny. There was a concern among certain justices that if
RFRA is interpreted to have a strict scrutiny standard, then the entire U.S. Code will be
subject to review of possible burdens to corporate religions rights.229 The Court would
have to consider how likely it would be that religious objectors would come out of the
woodwork to make such claims230 in the future, given that there has been very little
objection in the past.231 It would have to consider whether RFRA directs the Court back
to a body of constitutional law that applies a balancing test, not a compelling interest
test.232
If the Court were to find that the Respondents are able to bring a claim under
RFRA, it would proceed to the merits of the RFRA claim. The Court would not inquire
into the religious beliefs themselves but would accept them. The sincerity of religious
beliefs may be questioned, but in this case they were not questioned.
The Court would then need to determine whether the Respondents were able to
demonstrate that the mandate burdens their sincere religious exercise. Respondents said
yes, because their religious beliefs prohibit them from providing contraception coverage
that destroys a human embryo and the government has placed substantial pressure on
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them to violate this belief by imposing a legal mandate which is enforced by penalties
($475 million a year). If the employer drops the plan against its faith-based interest in
providing adequate benefits to employees, it would still need to pay a substantial tax ($26
million a year). It would suffer a competitive disadvantage because generous benefits are
important to recruit and retain the best employees. Increasing wages may not make up
for lack of a good health plan and would cost more out of pocket. The combination of
the mandate and the penalty felt punitive to the Respondents. In addition, the
government exempted others for the exact same beliefs so it recognized the burden the
mandate imposed.
The government said no, the employer has a choice of dropping the plan
altogether, not providing the coverage against its belief, and only paying a tax. The tax is
substantial, but would not drive the employer out of business and would be offset by the
cost savings of not providing insurance. To avoid hurting employees, employers could
pay higher wages, which employees could use to pay for their own health insurance on
the exchanges.233 In addition, providing coverage is too attenuated because individual
decisions by employees to select contraceptives are not attributable to the employer or its
owners. It is up to the Court objectively to decide if there is actually a substantial burden
and this does not depend on how the burden feels to Respondents.234
If the Court were to find a substantial burden on the Respondents’ exercise of
religion, under RFRA, the government must then prove a compelling state interest that is
narrowly tailored to apply to the particular claimant. The Court must decide if it would
extend this strict scrutiny standard to for-profit companies or if it would apply another
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standard, urged by the government, taking the burden on the employees of having to
obtain contraception coverage by other means into account. The issue as articulated by
the government is whether RFRA allows a for-profit company, based on religious
objections, to deny employees a right conferred by federal law. The standard that the
government urged the Court adopt is whether providing contraception coverage to
employees is in furtherance of the government’s interest in ensuring that contraceptive
coverage is available. The government’s three compelling interests were in order:
uniformity of a comprehensive insurance law, public health, and gender equity.
The new standard urged by the government was that limitations must be placed on
the exercise of religious freedom that collides with the liberties of others.235 The Court
would need to decide if this standard is inconsistent with RFRA, which provides
exceptions for religious views and sets out a strict scrutiny test to be followed.236 The
Court would have to decide if it would look for guidance to the pre-Smith cases and
apply a “balancing” test, used for religious accommodations under the Establishment
Clause. The Court could decide instead that the standard set forth in RFRA is the correct
standard to be applied. It demands more of a strict review than the pre-Smith cases
provide and does not involve “balancing of interests.”237
The Court would need to consider Respondents’ claim that so many exemptions
have been granted already to tens of millions of people for secular and religious reasons,
particularly in grandfathered plans and small plans, that this has undermined the claimed
compelling interest in uniformity. It would need to consider the claim that public health
and gender equity interests are far too broad for meaningful application of strict scrutiny.
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Respondents maintained that the government must show real proof that the exclusion of
the four contraceptives in this instance would threaten public health or gender equality.
The Court would need to consider that, if these interests were so important, then why
have so many other employers been exempted from the mandate and why has HHS been
granted open-ended authority to grant exemptions. One member of the Court voiced a
concern that where there is a First Amendment issue of this consequence, the Congress,
and not merely an agency, should have made decisions on exemptions.238
If the Court were to find that there is a compelling state interest, it would need to
decide whether the government has accomplished it by the least restrictive means. The
Respondents said that the government must prove that its compelling state interests
would be fundamentally frustrated by any other means chosen. In other words, its
interests cannot be met if Respondents are exempted from providing four of the twenty
contraceptives. The Respondents suggested that one least restrictive alternative is for the
government to pay for its contraceptives itself, as it is already doing with other
government subsidy family planning programs such as Title X.239 The government
argued that this would result in an open-ended increase in the cost of the government. It
also argued that other means such as the accommodation granted to the religious nonprofits by HHS would be “less effective in achieving the interest.” The government’s
different statement of the test was whether the alternative means suggested by
Respondents advanced the compelling state interest as effectively.
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At the end of oral argument, at the Respondents’ rebuttal, the accommodation
offered to the religious non-profits was raised and Respondent’s counsel, Paul Clement,
was asked whether that would be acceptable. Mr. Clement declined to say what his
clients would do, but suggested that the government could offer something similar that
was done for the Little Sisters of the Poor, a highly publicized non-profit in which the
Supreme Court had granted an emergency stay of the mandate pending outcome of
litigation. If such an offer were made to his clients, “there wouldn’t be a problem with
that.”240
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Conclusion
The Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, no matter what the outcome, will help to
provide some stability in the volatile and polarizing debate over the limits of religious
freedom between the faith community and the government, but will not end it. The most
important holding would be whether for-profit corporations may exercise religion. If the
Court were to find that for-profit organizations do not have the same religious free
exercise rights as individuals under RFRA, it would not reach the merits of the RFRA
claim, and for-profits would not be able to bring any more claims under RFRA. Pending
for-profit cases would be dismissed, but the many non-profit cases would continue.241 It
is possible, but not likely, that the Court may decide the same question under the First
Amendment, following the Third Circuit’s reasoning. It that case, it would avoid a ruling
under RFRA.
If the Court were to allow standing to the for-profits and make a ruling on the
merits of the RFRA claim, following the approach of the Tenth Circuit, such a ruling
would have far reaching consequences on all the cases filed by religious for-profits and
non-profits. Court observers are concerned that a broad ruling in favor of for-profit
corporations may create much more litigation with religious objections trumping civil
rights.242 However, a narrow ruling limited to closely held companies would not have this
effect. A ruling against the for-profits would involve at least a finding that the
government has established a compelling interest. The Court may even apply the more
relaxed balancing test to define that interest. Whether the interest can only be achieved
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by forcing religious objectors to comply is open to question, which is why the issue of
accommodation would then become the important issue before the Court.
The mandate originated as a positive reform, but it was promulgated without
achieving consensus with religious objectors who viewed it as a threat to fundamental
religious liberty. Proponents of the mandate on the other hand see accommodation of
religion and even RFRA itself as a threat to fundamental civil rights. In a way, equal
protection has been pitted against the First Amendment. If leaders of both sides had been
able to work together more effectively, perhaps this type of polarization could have been
avoided.
For many years the mandate was used by federal law to promote gender
inequality as well as public health and avoided controversy, although it helped by a few
important court decisions. By 2007, without much litigation, over 90% of private
insurance plans covered prescription contraceptives.243
The state insurance laws provided good examples of different kinds of
exemptions for religious employers, exclusion of abortifacients, and ways of ensuring
that employees still got the coverage they needed, usually with a rider on the policy
which cost was controlled. Besides the litigation in New York and California, there was
no great controversy. The concept of federalism was successful here because that which
originates in the states is closer to the people and is therefore more secure. But these
moderate solutions that were working were not chosen.
The HHS mandate was modeled after the New York and California mandates with
the narrowest exemptions with the result that the strictest of mandates was now the rule
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for all the states. This strategy promoted the government interest in distributing
contraceptives as widely as possible, but it upset the balance that the states had created
and did not take into account the needs of religious institutions. In addition, the mandate
did not appear until after the ACA had been in effect for a year, which added an element
of surprise for religious groups, which increased distrust.
Ideas have been put forth to avoid a clash between religious liberty and gender
equity, ranging from adopting a broader exemption like most of the state mandates to
various types of accommodations. These accommodations include offering individual
health policies, and providing contraception through government subsidized Title X
providers like Planned Parenthood that are already providing family planning services.
The particular items that are identified as abortifacients could be provided for separately
but most of the contraceptives would be unobjectionable, at least to the for-profit
religious employers in the Hobby Lobby case. Counsel for Respondents suggested at oral
argument that this is really about who pays, and the least restrictive means requirement of
RFRA may be satisfied in this manner.244 A third party insurer paying would not be
objectionable to the Respondents, but may not be to religious non-profits depending on
how they perceive their degree of involvement.
HHS as a rulemaking body may come under scrutiny itself for its inability to find
the right balance of accommodation, but HHS may not have been the right body to hand
the decision making. At oral argument Justice Kennedy seemed to say that HHS should
not have been delegated the important power to grant religious exemptions in the first
place and that Congress should have made the decision.245
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Professor Doug Laycock, whose scholarly articles on religion have been cited in
many Supreme Court opinions, is concerned about the tide of public opinion turning
against religious liberty, because what conservative churches view as a sin is seen by
others as a fundamental human right.246 The two sides each are insisting on a total win.
In a recent symposium on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of RFRA, he said that
the debate about religious liberty and sexual morality has turned much of the country
against religious liberty, or at least the view that it must be construed very narrowly. If
this trend in public opinion continues, then RFRA will be no help, and the loss of
religious liberty will be a loss for America.
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